RELATIONS BETWEEN THE INSTALLATION OF DEMOCRACY AND THE ANTI-AUSTERITY PROTEST BEHAVIOR. SPANISH INDIGNADOS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT: According to recent research, the age of democratic institutions can influence whether citizens demonstrate because the opening up of political freedom in the state may have a positive impact on protest behavior. This research addresses the problem to what extent these theories are useful to explain the diversity of post-2008 anti-austerity protests in Europe. It aims to test theory-driven hypotheses to tell how the history-rooted macrolevel factor influenced the protest behavior of anti-austerity movements. The research uses a method of sources analysis and conceptual qualitative content analysis to collect data and formulate an original database for the movements. It employs a statistical analysis method, Pearson correlation technique, and conducts a two-tail test to verify the hypotheses. The research argues that some reservations have to accompany the assumption that the younger the democratic regime is, the less likely to stage demonstrations the anti-austerity movement in this state is.

KEY WORDS: Protest behavior – times of austerity – political violence – protest movement – Europe – contentious politics – contention

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Relaciones entre la instalación de la democracia y el comportamiento de protesta anti-austeridad. Indignados españoles en perspectiva comparada

Resumen: Según investigaciones recientes, la longevidad de las instituciones democráticas influye en la capacidad de acción de los ciudadanos, ya que el grado de libertad política en un Estado fomenta al alza el apoyo a los movimientos de protesta. Esta investigación aborda el problema de que hasta qué punto, estas teorías son útiles para explicar la diversidad de una ola de protestas contra las medidas de austeridad aplicada en Europa después de 2008. El objetivo es probar las hipótesis basadas en la teoría que explica cómo el factor del nivel macro enraizado en la historia influyó en el comportamiento de protesta de los movimientos anti-austeridad. La investigación utiliza un método de análisis de fuentes y análisis de contenido conceptual cualitativo para recopilar datos y formular una base de datos original para los movimientos. Se emplea el método de análisis estadístico, la técnica de correlación de Pearson, junto a una prueba de dos métodos para verificar las hipótesis. La investigación sostiene, con algunas reservas, la suposición de que cuanto más joven es el régimen democrático, menos probabilidades existen de que se realicen manifestaciones del movimiento anti-austeridad en ese Estado.

Palabras clave: Comportamiento de protesta – tiempos de austeridad – violencia política – movimiento de protesta – Europa – política polémica – disputa

Introduction and preliminary methodological assumptions

The recent research on protest behavior suggests that the age of democratic institutions can influence whether citizens stage demonstrations. The opening up of political freedom in the state is reckoned to have a positive impact on protest behavior. This effect is more likely to occur in the states where society holds longstanding and unresolved socio-economic grievances against the government. Citizens in younger democracies are considered to be less likely to protest than citizens of older democracies because the former are less likely to believe that the government will react to their demands. Citizens in younger democracies are also thought to be less likely to build particular performances

into their contentious repertoires because they are less likely to believe that they may benefit from their political activity and effort. In turn, citizens in older democracies are maintained to be more likely to use innovations as a means of protest because they are more likely to think that creative performances can make their claims visible in a public space and make their political activity effective. Moreover, citizens in younger democracies have limited experience with government officials responding to constituent interests. Therefore, those citizens are less likely to believe that making demands on the government will have any influence on the policymaking process. But are these theories useful to account for the diversity of a recent post-2008 wave of anti-austerity protests in Europe? Are the theoretical frameworks drawn from the theories employable to discover why the participants of social movements staged peaceful protests in some states, violent in others, and why they decided not to protest in the remaining states?

In 2010, the first anti-austerity movements took to the streets to express grievances over their socio-economic situation. The protest spread fast from one state to another. In 2011, the 15-M Movement, the most famous for its contentious repertoire European anti-austerity movement occurred in Spain. The participants of the 15-M Movement often clashed with representatives of Spanish state apparatus, mainly police and riot police. The activists eagerly used physical force during protests. According to the Spanish police’s report, from 2011 to 2015, 14.14 percent of 229,437 demonstrations required the presence of the Anti-Riot Unit, but 97.84 percent of them took place without any incident. During protests, policemen arrested 982 activists because, according to Spanish law, they committed crimes.

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identity, and actively pursued an amendment of their social situation often by organizing demonstrations⁸. A repertoire of contention was, however, considerably broader and contained the formation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, marches, vigils, rallies, strikes, petition drives, attacks on the public and private property as well as on representatives of the state apparatus, statements to and in public media, activities in commercial and social media, performances, “shivaree”, and pamphleteering. The highly active Spanish movement inspired activists in other European states and thus they created the international movement “Indignados”⁹. The “Indignados”, however, was not homogenous even in these Eurozone-states which shared historical experience and political values¹⁰. Unlike Spanish “Indignados”, Austrian and French movements avoided using active physical force. Nevertheless, just like the 15-M Movement, Greek and Irish protest movements used active physical political violence during protests. While Spaniards demonstrated, Slovaks and Estonians did not hold demonstrations. Whereas Italian and Belgian movements used similar repertoires of contention to Spaniards, Slovenes and Greeks build particular performances in their repertoires. The recent research does not account for the similarities and differences between the 15-M Movement and other anti-austerity movements. In conducting the comparative analysis of anti-austerity movements in historical context, the article places Spain against the background of other European states.

The purpose of the article is, therefore, twofold. First, it tests theory-driven hypotheses to evaluate to what extent the history-rooted macrolevel factor influenced the protest activity of anti-austerity movements in Spain and other European states¹¹. Second, in drawing upon the critical approach to the theory, it explains why the protest activities were diversified in the Eurozone states. It sheds light on similarities and differences between Spanish and other “In-

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dignados” movements. Thus, the paper determines the explanatory power of the current theories on protest behavior for the thus far insufficiently studied research field of anti-austerity movements.

This study delves analytically into the relations between the macrolevel factor and the protest activities of anti-austerity movements. It proposes the following major null and alternative hypotheses:

- **1H₀**: There might be no correlation between the age of democracy and the type of protest behavior of anti-austerity movements.
- **1H₁**: Perhaps, the younger the democratic regime is, the less likely to protest the anti-austerity movement in this state is.

Additionally, it advances the three sets of specific null and alternative hypotheses that concern the components of the dependent variable (the protest behavior) considered in the major hypotheses. It means that the category of protest behavior mentioned in 1H encompasses and consists of the three protest activities mentioned in 2H, 3H, and 4H. The specific hypotheses treat these components as the separate dependent variables so as the research could control for their individual roles in the relations between the examined factors. Accordingly, the analysis computes correlations between the age of democracy and the protest behavior (1H) and the essential features of the protest behavior (2H, 3H, and 4H).

The first set of specific hypotheses concerns demonstrations as a particular means of protest mentioned in the theories:

- **2H₀**: There might be no correlation between the age of democracy and the use of demonstrations as a means of protest by anti-austerity movements.
- **2H₁**: Perhaps, the younger the democratic regime is, the less likely to demonstrate the anti-austerity movement in this state is.

The next set of specific hypotheses focuses on the role of the kinds of political violence used during protests:

- **3H₀**: There might be no correlation between the age of democracy and the forms of political violence used by anti-austerity movements during protests.
- **3H₁**: Perhaps, the younger the democratic regime is, the less likely to use passive and active physical political violence the anti-austerity movement in this state is.

The last set of specific hypotheses concentrates on the use of innovations to manifest opposition to austerity programs during protests:

- **4H₀**: There might be no correlation between the age of democracy and the embodiment of modular performances to the anti-austerity movement’s contentious repertoires.
- **4H₁**: Perhaps, the younger the democratic regime is, the less likely to embody modular performances to a contentious repertoire the anti-austerity movement in this state is.
The research tests the hypotheses by doing the comparative analysis of the cases which meet the criteria mentioned in the theories. After the great global financial crisis in 2008, the austerity policies were imposed on the states to recover their markets. Those socially unpopular programs resulted in the occurrence and development of protest movements. Initially Spanish “Indignados”, and then other austerity-driven European societies held long-standing and unresolved socio-economic grievances against their governments and the European Union.

This research formulates two essential criteria for the case selection. Firstly, this research takes into consideration the states where both the state governments and the European Union implemented austerity policies because the analysis strives to cover the population with common historical, political, cultural, and economic experience. Secondly, the study involves the protest behavior of the movements which manifested opposition to austerity programs more than once during the cycle of post-2008 anti-austerity contention determined by social mobilization and demobilization.

For the sake of clarity, in this research, the anti-austerity movements are

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defined as conscious, collective, and organized efforts at the abandonment of austerity measures, removing their results, and providing or restoring social well-being. They exist over some span of time by engaging in a conflictual issue with the imposers of austerity policies, especially the European Union and the governments and actively strive for an amendment of their social situation often by employing protest. The following 14 states meet these two criteria concomitantly: Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Italy.

The research applies the sources analysis method to determine the values of protest behavior and the installation of democracy for the European states. It collects articles and visual materials published in public, commercial, and social media from 14 states from 2008–2015 according to the principle of theoretical sampling. Then, it conducts the conceptual qualitative content analysis of the police reports requested from the state police offices and media discourse. The triangulation of research techniques allows us to control for potential distortions in the sources.

In employing the statistical analysis method, the research tests the theory-driven hypotheses. The Pearson correlation technique enables us to establish a type and strength of linear correlations between the explaining variable and the variable to be explained. The scale for the interpretation of the results of Pearson linear correlation (r) is as follows for positive coefficients: $|r| = 0$ – the absence of correlation; $0.0 < |r| \leq 0.1$ – very small positive correlation; $0.1 < |r| \leq 0.3$ – small positive correlation; $0.3 < |r| \leq 0.5$ – medium positive correlation; $0.5 < |r| \leq 0.7$ – strong positive correlation; $0.7 < |r| \leq 0.9$ – very strong positive correlation; $0.9 < |r| < 1.0$ – almost full positive correlation; $|r| = 1.0$ – full positive correlation. The article adopts a parallel scale for negative coefficients: $|r| = 0$ – the absence of correlation; $0.0 > |r| \geq -0.1$ – very small negative correlation; $-0.1 > |r| \geq -0.3$ – small negative correlation; $-0.3 > |r| \geq -0.5$ – medium negative correlation; $-0.5 > |r| \geq -0.7$ – strong negative correlation; $-0.7 > |r| \geq -0.9$ – very strong negative correlation; $-0.9 > |r| > -1.0$ – almost full negative correlation; and $|r| = -1.0$ – full negative correlation. There is also conducted a two-tail test to compute the statistical significance of the correlations (Sig. 2-tailed). A standard scale is accepted to assess statistical significance. The Pearson correlation is significant when the Sig. 2-tailed is at the 0.05 level or lower. It is not significant when the coefficient is at a level higher than 0.05.

ANTI-AUSTERY PROTEST BEHAVIOR: THE VALUES OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

In the line of the tested theories and hypotheses, the type of the anti-austerity movement’s protest behavior is the dependent variable (DV). Nevertheless, this theoretical category is usually approached descriptively, and the current specialist literature fails to introduce an analytically effective research tool for its measurement\(^{19}\). This part of the article proposes a measurable category of protest behavior and measures this feature of the anti-austerity movements in the European states.

Anti-austerity protest behavior is a theoretical category which takes the form of a latent variable\(^ {20}\). It as a configuration of activities undertaken by, here, an anti-austerity movement in a political structure, which is determined by the time, subject, and subject matter indicators. Three concepts constitute the very nature of the configuration. They allow us to operationalize the essential features of the category. It means that we have to answer the three questions to identify what kind of protest behavior occurred in each state: did the participants of anti-austerity movement make use of demonstrations as a means of protest? What forms of political violence did they use? Did they build particular performances apart from the modular into their contentious repertoires? Three concepts drive the data collection questions to create a structured model for describing and comparing empirical cases. These concepts do double duty as analytical tools to address the questions comprehensively, systematically, and intersubjectively. The analysis applies the same set of questions and concept-based scales to examine the protest behavior in each state.

The first feature of the protest behavior is the use of demonstrations as a means of anti-austerity protest (\(f_1\)). Demonstrations are understood here as social gatherings in public places held to manifest opposition or support for something. The research proposes a simple dichotomic scale to measure the feature. The values on the scale are the avoidance of demonstration organization (coded as 1) and the employment of demonstration as a means of anti-austerity protests (coded as 2).

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In Estonia\textsuperscript{21} and Slovakia\textsuperscript{22}, anti-austerity movements avoided holding demonstrations. This means of protest was employed in the remaining states, Austria\textsuperscript{23}, the Netherlands\textsuperscript{24}, France\textsuperscript{25}, Finland\textsuperscript{26}, Belgium\textsuperscript{27}, Germany\textsuperscript{28}, Portugal\textsuperscript{29}, Slovenia\textsuperscript{30}, Italy\textsuperscript{31}, Greece\textsuperscript{32}, Spain\textsuperscript{33}, and Ireland\textsuperscript{34} (see Table 1).

Table 1. The use of demonstrations as a means of protest in the post-2008 European states

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textsuperscript{21} Clara GURALNIK, \textit{Respond to query no 1.1-14/368-2: Information from the Police and Border Guard Board}, Register: 70008747, Estonia 2017 [in the Author's archive].
\textsuperscript{29} Esquerda, “Centenas de pessoas em protesto nas ruas de Lisboa contra visita de Merkel”, \textit{Esquerda.net} November 12, 2013, http://www.esquerda.net/artigo/centenas-de-pessoas-em-protesto-nas-ruas-de-lisboa-contra-visita-de-merkel/25423 [September 16, 2018].
\textsuperscript{34} Mark PIGGOTT, “Ireland: 80,000 march in protest at austerity linked new water charges”, \textit{International Business Times} August 30, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ireland-80000-march-protest-austerity-linked-new-water-charges-1517706 [September 16, 2018].
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
The post-2008 European states

The use of demonstrations as a means of protest (f1)

The coded values of the feature (f1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>n</th>
<th>The post-2008 European states</th>
<th>The use of demonstrations as a means of protest (f1)</th>
<th>The coded values of the feature (f1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own study on the basis of the information obtained from the state police offices and mass media.

The next feature of the protest behavior is studied with the forms of political violence used during anti-austerity protests (f₂). Political violence is defined as intentional influencing by a political subject the thinking process, behavior, or physical state of another political subject, without authority of the political subject under the influence, to obtain political objectives. The objectives are focused on public goods. Accordingly, political subjects use political violence to create, destroy, protect, deprive of protection, distribute, and stop the distribution of public goods. Political violence may be an overt action or a non-action on the level of motivation. This research differentiates three forms of political violence with the criterion of force’s role in the process of influencing. Firstly, the mental type draws directly on gaining influence through multifarious appeal performed with verbal and non-verbal activities. Secondly, passive physical violence is the threat of the use of force. Thirdly, active physical violence uses force. The feature of the form of political violence used during protests takes on the following three major values: the use of mental political violence as the only form of violence (coded as 1), the employment of both mental and passive physical political violence (coded as 2), and the commitment of mental, passive and active physical political violence (coded as 3).
In Estonia\textsuperscript{35} and Slovakia\textsuperscript{36}, the anti-austerity movements used exclusively mental political violence during anti-austerity protests. Both mental and passive physical political violence were in use in Austria\textsuperscript{37}, the Netherlands\textsuperscript{38}, and France\textsuperscript{39}. In the other states, Finland\textsuperscript{40}, Belgium\textsuperscript{41}, Germany\textsuperscript{42}, Portugal\textsuperscript{43}, Slovenia\textsuperscript{44}, Italy\textsuperscript{45}, Greece\textsuperscript{46}, Spain\textsuperscript{47}, and Ireland\textsuperscript{48}, all the determined forms of political violence occurred (see Table 2).

\textsuperscript{35} Clara GURALNIK, \textit{op. cit.}\textsuperscript{.}


\textsuperscript{37} Rosie WAITES, “Austrians disillusioned with EU austerity”, \textit{The Local} May 20, 2014, \url{http://www.thelocal.at/20140520/why-the-eu-elections-matter-to-austria} [September 21, 2018].

\textsuperscript{38} Kate CONNOLLY, Angelique CHRISAFIS, “Anti-austerity movements gaining momentum across Europe”, \textit{The Guardian} April 27, 2012, \url{https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/27/anti-austerity-movements-europe} [September 21, 2018].


\textsuperscript{40} TRT World, “Finns take to streets for anti-austerity strike in Helsinki”, \textit{TRT World} September 19, 2015, \url{http://www.trtworld.com/europe/finns-take-to-streets-for-anti-austerity-strike-in-helsinki-8121} [September 21, 2018].

\textsuperscript{41} RT en français, “La police utilise des canons à eau lors d’une manifestation anti-austérité à Bruxelles”, \textit{RT en français}, October 7, 2015, \url{https://francais.rt.com/international/7960-belgique-bruxelles-austerite-manifestation} [September 21, 2018].

\textsuperscript{42} Spiegel, “Blockupy in Frankfurt am Main Ausnahmezustand rund um die EZB”, \textit{Spiegel} March 18, 2015, \url{http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/blockupy-protest-tausende-in-frankfurt-erwartet-a-1024115.html} [September 21, 2018].


\textsuperscript{44} Džemal DURIĆ, Danijel ŽIBRET, \textit{op. cit.}\textsuperscript{.}


\textsuperscript{46} Karolina TAGARIS, “Several thousand rally in Athens against austerity”, \textit{Reuters} June 21, 2015, \url{http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-protests-idUSKBN0P10VY20150621} [September 21, 2018].


Table 2. The forms of political violence used during protests in the post-2008 European states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>n</th>
<th>The post-2008 European states</th>
<th>The forms of political violence used during protests (f2)</th>
<th>The coded values of the feature (f2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>mental violence</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>mental violence</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>passive physical violence</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>passive physical violence</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>passive physical violence</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>active physical violence</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>active physical violence</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>active physical violence</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>active physical violence</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>active physical violence</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own study on the basis of the information obtained from the state police offices and mass media.

The third essential feature of the protest behavior is the embodiment of innovations to the contentious repertoires used by anti-austerity movements (f3). In adopting Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow’s conceptual framework of contentious politics, this research defines contentious repertoires as the arrays of performances that are currently known and available within some set of political actors. In turn, contentious performances are understood as standardized ways in which one set of political actors makes collective claims on some other set of political actors. The criterion of the use of innovations to make these collective claims allows us to distinguish between modular and particular performances. Whereas modular performances are contentious performances sta-


ged in more than one state\textsuperscript{51} during a wave of anti-austerity protests, particular performances are the unique innovations held exclusively in one state.

The analysis of the post-2008 anti-austerity protests shows that the modular performances were the creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, the Internet-based calls to action, public meetings, mass demonstrations, solemn processions, marches, vigils, rallies, strikes, petition drives, attacks on the public and private property as well as on the representatives of the other set of political actors, occupation of public facilities, statements to and in public media, activities in public, commercial, and social media, performances, charivaris (also called shivaree or simply rough music), putting posters in a public sphere, and pamphleteering\textsuperscript{52}. The remaining contentious performances were modular performances (e.g., Slovenian Culture Day, protestival, and holy mass of the Trans-Universal Zombie Church of the Blissful Ringing staged as anti-austerity events in Slovenia\textsuperscript{53}).

The embodiment of innovations to the contentious repertoires used by anti-austerity movements takes on two major values. First, when an anti-austerity movement employs only modular performances and avoids building particular performances into its contentious repertoire, it indicates that there are no innovations in the movement’s contentious repertoire (coded as 1). Second, when an anti-austerity movement makes use of both modular and particular performances, it means that the movement embodies innovations to its contentious repertoire (coded as 2).

The European anti-austerity movements built an array of modular performances into their contentious repertoires\textsuperscript{54}. In Estonia, the anti-austerity movement put posters in a public sphere, was active in public, commercial, and social media, and organized the Internet-based calls to action\textsuperscript{55}. In Slovakia,
apart from the contentious performances used in Estonia, the anti-austerity movement held a rally to discuss the situation of workers\(^56\). This rally, however, did not meet the criteria for demonstrations determined in this research. In the other states, Austria\(^57\), the Netherlands\(^58\), France\(^59\), Finland\(^60\), Belgium\(^61\), Germany\(^62\), Portugal\(^63\), Slovenia\(^64\), Italy\(^65\), Greece\(^66\), Spain\(^67\), and Ireland\(^68\), the anti-austerity movements additionally created special-purpose associations and coalitions, held public meetings, mass demonstrations, solemn processions, marches, vigils, strikes, petition drives, performances, occupied public facilities, published statements to and in public media, disseminated charivaris and pamphlets, and put posters in a public sphere. Attacks on the public and private property as well as on the representatives of the other set of political actors

\(^{56}\) Beata BALOGOVÁ, op. cit.


\(^{58}\) The Economist, op. cit.

\(^{59}\) Ben MCPARTLAND, op. cit.


\(^{61}\) Dsl - with wires, op. cit.


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took place in Finland\textsuperscript{69}, Belgium\textsuperscript{70}, Germany\textsuperscript{71}, Portugal\textsuperscript{72}, Slovenia\textsuperscript{73}, Italy\textsuperscript{74}, Greece\textsuperscript{75}, Spain\textsuperscript{76}, and Ireland\textsuperscript{77}.

Estonian, Slovak, Austrian, Dutch, Finnish, Belgian, German, Portuguese, Italian, Spanish, and Irish anti-austerity movements avoided embodying innovations to their contentious repertoires\textsuperscript{78}, which was a general tendency in the European states in times of austerity\textsuperscript{79}. Only in France, Slovenia, and Greece, the anti-austerity movements used particular performances. In France, the participants of the movement did stunts, used playing cars to disseminate charivaris, bedecked monuments, and mimicked Pokémon game\textsuperscript{80}. In turn, Slovene anti-austerity movement organized Slovenian Culture Day, protestival, and holy mass of the Trans-Universal Zombie Church of the Blissful Ringing\textsuperscript{81}. In


\textsuperscript{78} Joanna RAK, “Theorizing Cultures of Political Violence... op. cit., p. 76-96.


\textsuperscript{80} Ruptly, “France: Thousands protest against austerity measures”, Russia Today April 12, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MDO5Q_0RQqs [September 26, 2018].

Greece, a group of activists put plastic bags on their heads to manifest their attitudes towards social consequences of austerity programs\(^{82}\) (see Table 3).

### Table 3. The embodiment of innovations to the contentious repertoires used by anti-austerity movements in the post-2008 European states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>n</th>
<th>The post-2008 European states</th>
<th>The embodiment of innovations to the contentious repertoires used by anti-austerity movements (f3)</th>
<th>The coded values of the feature (f3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>modular performances</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>modular performances</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>modular performances</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>modular performances</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>modular and particular performances</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>modular performances</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>modular performances</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>modular performances</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>modular performances</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>modular and particular performances</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>modular performances</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>modular and particular performances</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>modular performances</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>modular performances</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own study on the basis of the information obtained from the state police offices and mass media.

The values of the main DV for the states are determined by configuring the values of the three essential features of the protest behavior: the use of demonstrations as a means of protest, the forms of political violence committed during protests, and the embodiment of innovations to the contentious repertoires employed by the anti-austerity movements. The variable of the protest behavior takes on five values, which indicates that five types of the protest behavior occurred in the European states in times of austerity. Accordingly, the values of the protest behavior constitute the typology of the protest behavior in the post-2008 European states (see Table 4). The typology consists of the following types: (i) conventionally non-violent and non-demonstrating (coded as 1), (ii) conventionally threatening and demonstrating (coded as 2),

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(iii) innovatively threatening and demonstrating (coded as 3), (iv) conventionally violent and demonstrating (coded as 4), and (v) innovatively violent and demonstrating (coded as 5).

The first type of the protest behavior, the conventionally non-violent and non-demonstrating model entered Estonia and Slovakia. In these states, the participants of the movements did not stage demonstrations and avoided using active and passive physical force when manifesting attitudes towards austerity measures. Additionally, they did not embody innovations to their contentious repertoires. The second type, the conventionally threatening and demonstrating model occurred in Austria and the Netherlands. Austrian and Dutch anti-austerity movements also did not make use of particular performances. They turned to the modular performances and staged peaceful demonstrations understood as events without the use of active physical violence where citizens made an organized appeal to the public and to policymakers to represent the protesters’ interests in the policymaking process. However, during these protests, the participants of the movement used passive physical violence. The third type, the innovatively threatening and demonstrating model was unique and typified only France. French anti-austerity movement employed demonstrations and particular performances to make claims. During contentious performances, they utilized passive physical force. The most frequently occurring type of protest behavior, the conventionally violent and demonstrating model entered Finland, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Ireland. In these seven states, the protest movements used mental, active and passive physical political violence during protests. They made use of only modular performances to manifest opposition to austerity programs. Nevertheless, they did not build demonstrations into their contentious repertoires. The last type of protest behavior, the innovatively violent and demonstrating model typified Slovenia and Greece. Just like the fourth type, Slovene and Greek anti-austerity movements employed mental, active and passive physical political violence to protest as well as demonstrations as a means of protest. In contrast to the fourth type, these movements mixed particular performances into their contentious repertoires.

Table 4. The types of the protest behavior in the post-2008 European states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>n</th>
<th>The post-2008 European states</th>
<th>The use of demonstrations as a means of protest</th>
<th>The forms of political violence used during protests</th>
<th>The embodiment of innovations to the contentious repertoires used by anti-austerity movements</th>
<th>The coded values of protest behavior</th>
<th>The types of the protest behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>conventionally non-violent and non-demonstrating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>conventionally non-violent and non-demonstrating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>conventionally threatening and demonstrating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>conventionally threatening and demonstrating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>innovatively threatening and demonstrating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>conventionally violent and demonstrating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>conventionally violent and demonstrating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>conventionally violent and demonstrating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>conventionally violent and demonstrating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>innovatively violent and demonstrating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>conventionally violent and demonstrating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>innovatively violent and demonstrating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>conventionally violent and demonstrating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>conventionally violent and demonstrating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own study on the basis of the information obtained from the state police offices and mass media.

THE INSTALLATION OF DEMOCRACY: THE VALUES OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

The theory-driven independent variable is the time from the last installation of democracy to the occurrence of an anti-austerity movement in the state (IDV). The pieces of data relevant for the IDV’s values for the states are collected from the Typology of the Cultures of Political Violence and the Polity IV project of the Center for Systemic Peace. The former database shows that the occurrence dates of the anti-austerity movements ($a_n$) were as follows: 2010 in Belgium, France, Ireland, Slovakia, and Italy; 2011 in Greece, Spain, and Portugal; 2012 in Austria, Estonia, the Netherlands, Germany, and Slovenia; and 2014 in Finland.

The latter database, Polity, sheds light on the dates of the last installation of democracy in the Eurozone states. Polity is an index created as part of the Polity data series by the Center for Systemic Peace under the initial direction of Tedd Gurr and later Monty G. Marshall, which has evolved over time since then.

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the seventies through five waves of assessment\textsuperscript{87}. The latest version has been updated since 2000, and the fifth wave of evaluation is ongoing. In this database, the unit of analysis is the “polity” defined as the “subsets of the class of ‘authority patterns’”, and the index depicts the modalities through which this authority is exercised in a political system\textsuperscript{88}. The index covers the political regimes of 167 states over the period 1800-2015\textsuperscript{89}, including the states analyzed in this research.

According to the theoretical approach adopted by the Polity researchers, democracy is defined as a political system based on the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can manifest effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders, the existence of proper checks and balances on the executive power, and the guarantee of civil liberties for citizens\textsuperscript{90}. Importantly for the research results’ quality, Polity IV provides us with, in particular, procedural measurement of democracy. It offers two distinct sub-indices of democracy and autocracy, based on the same six dimensions: regulation of chief executive recruitment, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on chief executive, regulation of participation, and competitiveness of participation\textsuperscript{91}. The two sub-indices are then merged into a single global additive index (Polity2) achieved by subtracting the “Autocracy” value from the “Democracy” value, which assigns scores in a scale from -10 to +10 to each political regime. According to the Polity researchers’ theoretical assumptions, the two extreme points correspond to the full practical performance of the fundamental principles of an authoritarian or democratic system. This index is convertible into regime categories: “Autocracies” (-10 to -6), “Anocracies” (-5 to +5), which exhibit mixed qualities of the two distinct patterns of authority, and “Democracies” (+6 to +10)\textsuperscript{92}.

This research concentrates on the Polity IV index of the Date of Most Recent Polity Transition and makes use of the Begin Date index that lists the date of the beginning of the current regime. It is the indicator of the democracy installation in a state. According to Polity IV, the dates of the last democracy


\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Ibidem.}

\textsuperscript{89} Center for Systemic Peace, \textit{The Polity Project}, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html [September 3, 2018].

\textsuperscript{90} Luca TOMINI, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 28.


\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Ibidem.} For discussion see: Shawn TREIER, Simon JACKMAN, “Democracy as a latent variable”, \textit{American Journal of Political Science} 52 (1/2008), p. 201-217.
installation \((b_n)\) were the following: 2000 for Estonia\(^93\), 1993 for Slovakia\(^94\), 1946 for Austria\(^95\), 1945 for the Netherlands\(^96\), 1969 for France\(^97\), 1944 for Finland\(^98\), 1853 for Belgium\(^99\), 1990 for Germany\(^100\), 1976 for Portugal\(^101\), 1991 for Slovenia\(^102\), 1948 for Italy\(^103\), 1967 for Greece\(^104\), 1978 for Spain\(^105\), and 1921 for Ireland\(^106\).

The period covered by the IDV is the difference \((c_n)\) being the result of subtracting \(b_n\) from \(a_n\). The occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement is the minuend \((a_n)\), whereas the date of the junctures indicator’s last occurrence is the subtrahend \((b_n)\). The values of the IDV are determined on the basis of the simple subtraction expressible in the shape of the following straightforward algebraic expression: \(a_n - b_n = c_n\). According to the calculation results, the variable takes on the following values: 12 years for Estonia, 17 for Slovakia, 66 for Austria, 67 for the Netherlands, 41 for France, 70 for Finland, 157 for Belgium, 22 for Germany, 35 for Portugal, 21 for Slovenia, 62 for Italy, 44 for Greece, 33 for Spain, and 89 for Ireland (see Table 5).

Although the current research on protest behavior and the age of democracy advance the theories or rights revealing the types of relations between the factors, they do not conceive scales for the case classification. As the studies

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show, until fifteen years after democratic installation, the state still ought to be perceived to be in a consolidation phase. Additionally, until five years after democratic installation, there is no certainty of long-term stability of the new democratic institution.\textsuperscript{107} In drawing on the literature review on democratic consolidation and stability of democracies,\textsuperscript{108} as well as the empirical distribution of the cases, this research proposes a ratio scale. It is divided into the decade ranges to avoid the excessive fragmentation of the cases, but simultaneously to identify and gather together those states with similar political experience.

The scale ranges from 0 to 160 years (the time from the date of the last democracy installation in a state to the occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement) because, in this study, the highest value of the IDV is 157. It is as follows: $0 \leq c_n \leq 10$ (coded as 1), $11 \leq c_n \leq 20$ (coded as 2), $21 \leq c_n \leq 30$ (coded as 3), $31 \leq c_n \leq 40$ (coded as 4), $41 \leq c_n \leq 50$ (coded as 5), $51 \leq c_n \leq 60$ (coded as 6), $61 \leq c_n \leq 70$ (coded as 7), $71 \leq c_n \leq 80$ (coded as 8), $81 \leq c_n \leq 90$ (coded as 9), $91 \leq c_n \leq 100$ (coded as 10), $101 \leq c_n \leq 110$ (coded as 11), $111 \leq c_n \leq 120$ (coded as 12), $121 \leq c_n \leq 130$ (coded as 13), $131 \leq c_n \leq 140$ (coded as 14), $141 \leq c_n \leq 150$ (coded as 15), and $151 \leq c_n \leq 160$ (coded as 16). Although this scale is not objectively acceptable and simplifies the classification of the cases, the detailed presentation of the following research steps allows us to conduct the research process once again but with the use of more specific analytical tools.

Table 5. The installation of democracy in the European states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>n</th>
<th>The post-2008 European states</th>
<th>The occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement (an for IDV)</th>
<th>The date of the last democracy installation in a state (bn for IDV)</th>
<th>The time from the date of the last democracy installation in a state to the occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement (in years) (cn =IDV)</th>
<th>The coded values of the IDV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{107} Luca TOMINI, op. cit., p. 60.

The hypothesis verification: types of relations between the variables

This part of the research computes the correlations between the time from the date of the last democracy installation in a state to the occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement (IDV) and the types of the protest behavior in the post-2008 European states (DV) to verify the major null hypothesis. It also introduces the correlations between the essential features of the protest behavior (f₁, f₂, and f₃) and the independent variable to test the specific null hypotheses, and, thus, examine whether any of the correlations was stronger than the correlation between the main hypothesis-driven categories. In determining the correlations, firstly, the research considers f₁, f₂, and f₃ the separate dependent variables. Secondly, it looks at them conjunctionally to discover the types of their configurations and treats these types as the values of the other dependent variable (the protest behavior).

Let us begin the analysis with the first component of the category of the protest behavior (2H). The Pearson correlation between the use of demonstrations as a means of protest (f₁) and the time from the date of the last democracy installation in a state to the occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement (IDV) equals 0.440. It indicates a medium positive correlation between the variables and proves that the coefficient is not significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0.115, which is appreciably higher than 0.05. Thus, there is no statistically significant correlation between the variables.
explaining indicator and the indicator to be explained at the 0.05 level (see Table 6).

The second essential feature of the protest behavior is determined by the forms of political violence used during protests (3H). The Pearson correlation between this feature \( f_2 \) and the time from the date of the last democracy installation in a state to the occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement (IDV) equals 0.375. It points out a medium positive correlation between the variables and shows that the coefficient is not significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0.186, which is considerably higher than 0.05. As the research results demonstrate, there is no statistically significant correlation between the explaining indicator and the indicator to be accounted for at the 0.05 level (see Table 6).

The last essential feature of the protest behavior is the embodiment of innovations to the contentious repertoires used by anti-austerity movements (4H). The Pearson correlation between this feature \( f_3 \) and the time from the date of the last democracy installation in a state to the occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement (IDV) equals -0.216. It is indicative of a small negative correlation between the variables and suggests that the coefficient is not significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0.458, which is prominently higher than 0.05. So, there is no statistically significant correlation between the explaining indicator and the indicator to be explained at the 0.05 level (see Table 6).

Finally, the Pearson correlation between the types of the protest behavior (DV) and the time from the date of the last democracy installation in a state to the occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement (IDV) equals 0.238 (1H). It signifies a small positive correlation between the variables and goes to show that the coefficient is not significantly different from 0. The Sig. 2-tailed level is 0.412, which is substantially higher than 0.05. According to these research results, there is no statistically significant correlation between the explaining indicator and the indicator to be accounted for at the 0.05 level (see Table 6).

**Table 6. Correlations between the essential features of protest behavior, the protest behavior and the installation of democracy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The essential features of the protest behavior ((f1–3)) and the protest behavior (DV)</th>
<th>The time from the date of the last democracy installation in a state to the occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement (IDV)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pearson Correlation</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.440</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sig. (2-tailed)</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.115</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Conclusions**

The analysis does not provide us with the unambiguous empirical evidence which would support the theories on the impact of the continuance of democratic institutions on how citizens make use of protest in the age of post-2008 austerity. As a result of the research, we cannot unreservedly reject the major null hypothesis that there might be no correlation between the age of democracy and the type of the protest behavior of the anti-austerity movements. The research indicates that just a small positive correlation exists between the types of the protest behavior and the time from the date of the last democracy installation in a state to the occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement. It also proves that the correlation is not statistically significant. Simultaneously, we cannot adopt the major alternative hypothesis. The analysis shows, however, that some reservations have to accompany the assumption that the younger the democratic regime is, the less likely to protest the anti-austerity movement in this state is.

Note should be taken, the correlations between the independent variable and two features of the protest behavior are stronger than the correlation between the main hypothesis-driven variables. The medium positive correlation occurs between the use of demonstrations as a means of protest and the time from the date of the last democracy installation in a state to the occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement. It means that the use of this modular performance is correlated with the age of democracy to a higher extent than the way of using contentious repertoires. In times of austerity, the forms of political violence employed during
protests also were to a higher extent correlated with the age of democratic institutions than the protest behavior. However, the use of innovations as a means of protest was to the smallest extent correlated with the independent variable. Interestingly, the particular performances in contentious repertoires which strongly influenced the cycles of contention in some states in the austerity-driven Europe were not determined by the history-rooted macrolevel factor.

Among all the European states, only two cases are classified to the second range on the ratio scale \((11 \leq c_n \leq 20)\), and there are no states located in the first range. In Estonia and Slovakia, the states with the shortest span from the date of the last democracy installation in a state to the occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement, the anti-austerity movements took advantage of the limited repertoire of contention. They employed just the modular performances and failed to build particular performances into their contentious repertoires. It means that no innovations occurred in their public events. In Estonia, they used the Internet-based call to action, activities in public, commercial, and social media, and installed posters in public places. In Slovakia, the workers who engaged in the protest movement additionally held the rally to discuss their economic situation. Estonians and Slovaks did not use passive and active physical force during protests. Importantly, it shows that in the younger democratic regimes, the anti-austerity movements were less likely to make use of demonstrations than in the older systems. Despite longstanding and unresolved socio-economic grievances against the government and the European Union, they avoided channeling their material and non-material resources to develop innovative types of protest and make claims during demonstrations. The research positively verifies the assumption that Estonians and Slovaks were less likely to believe that the government would react to their interest because of their relatively limited political experience with democratic institutions, mainly government officials responding to constituent interests. It provides empirical evidence that in these particular states with the youngest democratic institutions people were less likely to believe that making demands on the government would have any impact on the policymaking process.

Nevertheless, the time difference between the states where the anti-austerity movements did not organize demonstrations and some with violent demonstrations is not significant. For Slovakia, the time from the date of the last democracy installation in a state to the occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement totals 17 years, whereas it is 21 for Slovenia and 22 for Germany, the states with violent demonstrations. It indicates that the explanatory framework is worth developing so as to identify the factors potentially explaining the further differences and similarities between the models of anti-austerity protest behavior.

The time from the date of the last democracy installation in a state to the occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement ranges from 41 to 67 in the
states with peaceful anti-austerity demonstrations and from 21 to 157 in the states with violent demonstrations. These results prevent us from formulating any rights concerning differences between the states in which peaceful and violent demonstrations took place.

As the reservations to the assumptions show, the relations between the protest behavior and the age of democratic institutions need further research. The correlations show that the role of the use of demonstrations during protests might have been influenced by the history-rooted macrolevel factor. Thus, it may be analytically useful and promising to delve into the essential features of these two factors and examine relations between them.

The article contributes to political sociology by formulating the analytically effective theoretical category of the protest behavior. The research tests this tool and proposes the original typology of the protest behavior in the post-2008 austerity-driven European states. It also contributes to political history and comparative politics by testing the current theories and introducing the relations between the history-rooted macrolevel factor and the contemporary anti-austerity movements. The new database of the time from the date of the last democracy installation in a state to the occurrence date of an anti-austerity movement, the use of demonstrations as a means of protest, the forms of political violence used during protests, the embodiment of innovations to the contentious repertoires used by anti-austerity movements, and the types of the protest behavior for 14 states offers the data useful for future research on contentious politics in times of austerity.

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