

SPAIN'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE COUNTRY'S "INDIVIDUAL" AND "COLLECTIVE" INTERNATIONALISATION

MAŁGORZATA MIZERSKA-WROTKOWSKA

Universidad de Varsovia

m.mizerska-wrotkowska@uw.edu.pl

ABSTRACT: This article seeks to analyse the influence of Spain's democratic transition on the internationalisation of its foreign relations at levels which are bilateral (involving "individual" internationalisation) and multilateral ("collective" internationalisation). Analysis in pursuit of that goal encompassed relations with selected polities (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Portugal, The Holy See, Arab countries, Israel, the CEECs and Latin American states), as well as two international organisations (NATO and the Council of Europe). The work proceeded on the assumption that "internationalisation" constitutes the international expansion of a country, i.e. a process establishing relationships with external entities of various kinds. As regards methodology, use was made of the institutional-legal technique, decision-making elements, and the behavioural and comparative method, with arguments founded in the content of selected books, articles and other source materials (including politicians' speeches). The work confirms a thesis as to a positive impact of Spain's democratisation on its internationalisation, be that "individual" or "collective". Indeed, the process can be viewed as a necessary condition for Spain to recover full rights in the international arena.

KEY WORDS: Spain – democratisation – transformation – foreign policy – internationalisation

LA TRANSICIÓN DEMOCRÁTICA ESPAÑOLA Y SU INFLUENCIA EN LA INTERNACIONALIZACIÓN "INDIVIDUAL" Y "COLECTIVA" DEL PAÍS

RESUMEN: Este artículo busca analizar la influencia de la transición democrática en España en la internacionalización de sus relaciones exteriores tanto a nivel bilateral

Małgorzata Mizerska-Wrotkowska. Doctora habilitada en Ciencias Sociales en la disciplina de Ciencias Políticas (2020), doctora en Humanidades en el campo de las Ciencias Políticas (2007). Investigadora en la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Varsovia. Becaria de universidades de España, Suecia y México. Ganadora de la Beca del Ministerio de Ciencia y Educación Superior para jóvenes científicos destacados (2015-2018). En los años 2007-2023 impartió conferencias y dirigió clases, entre otras, en universidades de Madrid, Barcelona, Granada, Valencia y Cádiz. Coeditora de una serie editorial en colaboración con la Universidad CEU San Pablo de Madrid.

(internacionalización “individual”) como multilateral (internacionalización “colectiva”). Para ello se han seleccionado relaciones con diversos países (Estados Unidos, Reino Unido, Francia, Portugal, la Santa Sede, países árabes, Israel, países de Europa Central y del Este e Hispanoamérica) además de dos organizaciones internacionales (la OTAN y el Consejo de Europa). El trabajo entiende la “internacionalización” como la expansión internacional de un país, en un proceso de establecimiento de relaciones con entidades externas de distinto tipo. La metodología incluye la técnica institucional-legal, elementos de toma de decisiones y métodos conductuales y comparativos. La argumentación parte de la literatura académica existente, además de fuentes que incluyen discursos políticos. La investigación confirma la hipótesis de un impacto positivo de la democratización española en su proceso de internacionalización, tanto “individual” como “colectiva”. Este proceso puede considerarse una condición necesaria para que España recuperase una posición de pleno derecho en la arena internacional.

PALABRAS CLAVE: España – democratización – transformación – política exterior – internacionalización

INTRODUCTION

In the subject literature, the term “internationalisation” is seen to refer to economic issues, first and foremost¹. However, for the purposes of the work detailed here, it is political matters that have mainly been addressed. By invoking existing definitions of economic internationalisation and deploying analogy, it was assumed that “internationalisation” in political terms represents an international expansion of a country, i.e. a process by which relations with various kinds of external entity are established²; a state (and its foreign policy) is opened up to international exchange³; and connections are formed between various elements of state policy and foreign entities⁴.

The work leading up to the present article considered Spain’s internationalisation in its period of transition⁵. This type of internationalisation was capable

1 Krystian BARŁOŻEWSKI, *Wpływ ekspansji zagranicznej na efektywność przedsiębiorstw*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck, 2017, p. 15.

2 Mirosław JAROSIŃSKI, *Procesy i modele internacionalizacji polskich przedsiębiorstw*, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, 2013 (quoted from: Krystian BARŁOŻEWSKI, *Wpływ ekspansji zagranicznej ...*, *op. cit.* p. 16).

3 Krystian BARŁOŻEWSKI, *Wpływ ekspansji zagranicznej ...*, *op. cit.* p. 16.

4 Marzanna WITEK-HAJDUK, *Strategie internacionalizacji polskich przedsiębiorstw w warunkach akcesji Polski do Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, 2010 (quoted from: Krystian BARŁOŻEWSKI, *Wpływ ekspansji zagranicznej ...*, *op. cit.* p. 16).

5 For more on the subject: Jonathan STORY, Benny POLLACK, „Spain’s transition: external and domestic linkages” in Geoffrey PRIDHAM (ed.), *Encouraging democracy*, London: Leicester University Press 1991; Roberto MESA, „La normalización exterior de España” in Ramón COTALERO (ed.),

of being analysed in regard to "individual" and "collective" dimensions, with the former understood as concerning relations with other countries and polities, while the later addresses those pertaining with international organisations. In this context, Charles T. Powell wrote: "No one doubts that in the Spanish case it was the national actors who were the protagonists in the process (of transition), but their calculations and strategies were often shaped by the pressure of rules and structures designed beyond their borders"⁶.

The democratisation of Spanish foreign policy⁷ has roots in Fernando Castiella's appointment as Foreign Minister in the late 1950s. It was then that Spain intensified its international activity, becoming a member of such important structures as the European Organisation for Economic Cooperation, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. That period also ended with Spain's first-ever time as a Non-Permanent Member of the UN Security Council.

These facts contrast somewhat with what is formally conceived of as the beginning of Spain's democratic transition, i.e. 20th November 1975 –the day of the death of Francisco Franco. Historians often refer to a subsequent several-month period as entailing "Francoism without Franco". At that point, the main actor on Spain's political scene was Juan Carlos, who ascended the country's throne just two days after the General's death; and used his new prerogatives to begin both a transition in domestic policy and a redefining of foreign policy⁸. Transition was possible in a context of national consensus, and

Transición política y consolidación democrática. España, 1975-1986, Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1992; Małgorzata MIZERSKA-WROTKOWSKA, *Polityka zagraniczna Hiszpanii w latach 1788-1986. Od marginalizacji do integracji*, Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, 2019, p. 205-242 ; Pablo PÉREZ LÓPEZ (dir.), *La transición española: una perspectiva internacional*, Cizur Menor: Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, 2020. On the Spanish transition itself, see also: Virgilio Fransico CANDELA SEVILA, "Cuarenta años de democracia en España: análisis de las interpretaciones histórico políticas del proceso de transición (1977-2017)", *En Contexto. Revista de Investigación en Investigación en Administración, Contabilidad, Economía y Sociedad*, 6 (8/2018), p. 49-61; Marie-Claude CHAPUT, Julio PÉREZ-SERRANO (ed.), *La transición española. Nuevos enfoques para un viejo debate*, Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2015; Yurena GONZÁLEZ AYUSO, *Pasado y presente de la transición. Un estado de la cuestión pertinente*, Instituto de Estudios Latinoamericanos – Universidad de Alcalá, Documentos de trabajo IELAT, 80 (noviembre 2015); Gloria GARCÍA GONZÁLEZ, Manuel REDERO SAN ROMÁN, "Prensa y opinión pública en la transición política española", *Anales de la Universidad de Alicante: Historia contemporánea*, 8-9 (1991-1992), p. 85-120.

6 Charles T. POWELL, "La dimensión exterior de la transición política española", *Revista del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales*, 18 (1994), p. 79-116; see also: Lawrence WHITEHEAD, "Democracy by Convergence and Southern Europe: A Comparative Perspective" in Geoffrey PRIDHAM (ed.), *Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991.

7 It is worth consulting the latest publications on Spanish foreign policy, for example: José Ma BENEYTO PÉREZ, *Política exterior española*, Madrid: Tecnos, 2023.

8 Jonathan STORY, "Redefinición de las relaciones exteriores de España: 1975-1989" in Richard GILLESPIE, Fernando RODRIGO, Jonathan STORY (coord.), *Las relaciones exteriores de la España democrática*, Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1995, p. 53, 55.

given the person of a monarch able to bring the Spanish people together. It was precisely thanks to King Juan Carlos that Spain was able to take first steps out of international isolation, and improve its image in the world⁹.

Becoming King, Juan Carlos gave a clear signal that planned reform would restore a status for Spain as a full participant in international relations. The Coronation Speech heralded a search for “a true consensus of national concord”, as well as action to prepare Spain for full integration with Europe, “with all that this implies”¹⁰.

“INDIVIDUAL” INTERNATIONALISATION

THE UNITED STATES

Bilaterally, the US was an important *de facto* partner for Spain from the 1950s onwards, though Paris-based talks over a formalised Spanish-US agreement were advanced by the December of 1975. The negotiators were José María de Areilza on the Spanish side and Henry Kissinger on the American. Charles Powell reasonably describes the latter as “arguably the most influential figure in American foreign policy at the time, during the administrations of Richard M. Nixon (1969-1974) and Gerald R. Ford (1974-1977)”¹¹. In concrete terms, the USA agreed to elevate the status of existing (ordinary implementing) agreements with Spain over military bases to that of a Treaty requiring Senate ratification. However, Kissinger was keen to see tangible progress with Spain’s transition more generally, as he otherwise feared a negative reaction from Congress¹².

In the event, a Spanish-US Friendship and Cooperation Agreement was signed in January 1976¹³. It *inter alia* provided for the withdrawal of the USN’s 16th Submarine Squadron from the Rota Naval Base in 1979, the strengthening of institutional relations with NATO, and Spanish-US cooperation over

9 A few days before his death, General Franco himself spoke about the “secular foreign hostility” towards Spain; José Mario ARMERO, *Política exterior de España en democracia*, Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1989, p. 19.

10 *ABC* (23 November 1975) (quoted from: Jonathan STORY, “Redefinición de las relaciones...”, *op cit.*, p. 56).

11 Charles POWELL, “Estados Unidos y España, de la dictadura a la democracia: el papel de Henry A. Kissinger (1969-1977)” in Charles POWELL, Juan Carlos JIMÉNEZ REDONDO (ed.), *Del autoritarismo a la democracia. Estudios de política exterior*, Madrid: Silex, 2007, p. 20 or Charles POWELL, “Henry Kissinger y España, de la dictadura a la democracia”, *Historia y Política*, 17 (2007), p. 224.

12 José Mario ARMERO, *Política exterior de España...*, *op. cit.*, p. 26-27.

13 In reality, there were two documents: *Tratado de Amistad y Cooperación entre España y los Estados Unidos de América* (24.01.1976) y *Acuerdo de Desarrollo del Tratado de Amistad y Cooperación* (31.01.1976), “Boletín Oficial del Estado” n° 267 (06.11.1976), p. 21911-21941.

armaments' manufacture¹⁴." The Spanish authorities would have liked the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation to be ratified before the King and Queen's trip, precisely to avoid giving the impression that the Senators wanted to examine the monarch's democratic credentials before doing so, but the difficulties of all kinds that arose in Congress during the spring did not allow it¹⁵.

Thus, June 1976 saw Juan Carlos visit the USA, in line with what had been agreed previously. In the course of that Visit, he gave a speech to a Joint Congressional Session that was recognised as one of the most important of the transition period. He declared that: "The Monarchy will ensure that, in accordance with the principles of democracy, social peace and political stability are maintained in Spain, while at the same time ensuring the orderly access to power of the different government alternatives, according to the freely expressed wishes of the people (...) Spain resolutely assumes the role that corresponds to it in the international concert"¹⁶. Spain's King returned to his country with a pledge concerning millions of dollars of credit; and the granting of such a loan was proof-positive of American support for the direction Spain's reforms were taking. The financial markets had been awaiting such a declaration. The much-anticipated ratification of Spanish-American agreements took place on 18 September 1976¹⁷.

In November of the same year, Republican Gerald Ford's place as President was taken by Democrat Jimmy Carter. That change heralded a further raising of US support for Spain's democratisation process. At the end of April 1977, Prime Minister Suárez visited the United States; handing over the instruments of ratification for the Human Rights Covenants to the UN Secretary General, and meeting President Carter. Later, Madrid played host to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and Vice President Walter Mondale, who –according to Armero– was not convinced of the rationality of Spain being admitted into NATO.

After the signing of the new agreement in 1976, there was a tangible relaxation in mutual relations. Attempts were made to separate bilateral relations from Spain's relations with NATO, but this was not easy. Visits at a higher level took place in 1980. In the January, Prime Minister Suárez travelled to the

14 "Entra en vigor el tratado hispano-americano", *Ya* (22 September 1976) <http://www.march.es/ceacs/biblioteca/proyectos/linz/Documento.asp?Reg=r-13294>; [accessed 12 April 2023]; Jonathan STORY, "Redefinición de las relaciones exteriores...", *op. cit.*, p. 54-56.

15 Charles T. POWELL, "La dimensión exterior de la transición política española", *Revista del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales*, 18 (1994), p. 79-116; see also: Lawrence WHITEHEAD, "Democracy by Convergence and Southern Europe: A Comparative Perspective" in Geoffrey PRIDHAM (ed.), *Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991.

16 "Un discurso con gran autoridad", *ABC* (3 June 1976).

17 The US Senate ratified the agreements on 21 June 1976. The result of the vote was as follows: 84 votes in favour and 11 against.

US, where he spoke with Jimmy Carter about relations with Cuba, Central America, Afghanistan and the Middle East, where Spanish sympathies were not aligned with those of the US. The Spanish leader also promised to help out with negotiations with the Iranian authorities to achieve the release of US Embassy employees being held in Tehran. However, a failure (paradoxical in hindsight) to find support for a thesis regarding the international nature of terrorism proved troubling to Spain. The US authorities continued to see that matter as one of an internal nature.

Late June 1980 brought President Carter on a State Visit to Spain that not only continued work on previous issues, e.g. as regards the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), but also touched on Spain's admission to NATO and the future of the 1976 Treaty. Carter was also fulsome in thanking Suarez for his mediation in the matter of the American hostages¹⁸.

In short, there is here visible support for the statement that "the transitions most likely to succeed are those that do not pose a threat to the prevailing system of alliances, as well as those that tend to preserve or strengthen political and economic ties with the dominant power"¹⁹. The Spanish case seems to confirm that rule.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

It was Gibraltar that represented the core 'plot' when it came to Spain's relations with the UK during the former's transition period. As Adolfo Suárez's government took office, negotiations in that area were at an impasse. However, a government statement saying outright that Gibraltar should become an integral part of Spanish territory was not matched by any real-life action. Equally, the minor step of founding Spanish-Gibraltarian trading companies was also abandoned. This left the offensive on the part of Minister Marcelino Oreja as a purely verbal one, which underlined how Spain had apparently decolonised all its dependent territories, yet was condemned to the presence of a foreign colony on its own territory²⁰. He nevertheless referred to a rapid-onset search for a settlement that would prove mutually satisfactory, and would first and foremost take account of the interests of inhabitants in the disputed area²¹.

In the 'democratic' (1977-1981) period of the Suárez Government, Gibraltar remained the key issue in Spanish-UK relations. Spain did not give up the fight for a "reconquest", but never departed from the tenet that negotiations

18 José Mario ARMERO, *Política exterior de España...*, *op. cit.*, p. 43, 64-65, 118-120.

19 Charles T. POWELL, "La dimensión exterior de la transición...", *op. cit.*, p. 115.

20 *Discurso de Marcelino Oreja en la 63 Conferencia de la Unión Interparlamentaria*, 24 September 1976.

21 "Discurso de Marcelino Oreja en el foro de la Asamblea General de la ONU, 27.09.1976", *ABC* (23 October 1976).

should accord with UN law. No solution presented itself. On 5 April 1977, British Foreign Secretary David Owen invoked decisions of the OSCE Helsinki Summit, and called for Spain's blockade of Gibraltar to be lifted. Spain failed to react, though there was a November 1977 meeting in Strasbourg to which representatives of Gibraltar were invited. That gave rise to an agreement whereby Working Groups would be set up to find solutions in specific sectors, e.g. social security for Spanish employees, communications, etc. Such meetings took place a year later (18 July in London and 14 December in Madrid).

Such progress did little to change the rhetoric emerging from the Spanish authorities. In 1978, Minister Oreja repeated in the Senate that Spain's ultimate goal was to reintegrate Gibraltar, albeit with the government prepared to make certain concessions, up to and including a constitutional guarantee of autonomy for the area²². Equally, the opportunity provided by a UN General Assembly Session on disarmament was seized to convince one and all that Gibraltar –as a colonial enclave and military base on Spanish territory– posed a threat to the security of Spain. Later, another UN forum provided for it to be stressed that the UK's presence in Gibraltar violated the principle of territorial integrity of the state, to the point where the United Kingdom could be reprimanded in public for its failure to pursue the already-defined UN doctrine on decolonisation²³.

A critical moment as regards Gibraltar came on 10 April 1980, when Foreign Ministers Lord Peter Carrington and Marquess Marcelino Oreja put their signatures to the Lisbon Declaration, wherein both Governments expressed a willingness to settle their dispute in accordance with existing UN regulations (Paragraph 1), to start negotiations (Paragraph 2), and to re-establish communication (meaning Spain agreeing to suspend existing regulations –Paragraph 3). In addition, Spain and the United Kingdom confirmed that they considered it reasonable to embark upon cooperation that favoured both sides (Paragraph 4), and announced that their representatives would meet as soon as possible (Paragraphs 5 and 7). Starting points for the negotiations were also summarised, with Spain's desire being to re-establish territorial integrity even as the interests of Gibraltarian society were taken account of; and with a desire on the part of the UK for effect to go on being given to the democratically expressed will of the people of Gibraltar (Paragraph 6)²⁴.

Though immediate effect was not given to the Lisbon Declaration (with the opening of the border to pedestrians for example having to wait until 14 December 1982, under the administration of F. Gonzalez), that instrument

22 *Diario de Sesiones del Senado*, 9/1978, p. 462.

23 José Mario ARMERO, *Política exterior de España...*, *op.cit.*, p. 99-100.

24 "La declaración de Lisboa", *El País* (9 January 1982).

nevertheless represented a giant step forward when it came to the normalisation of Spain's relations with its maritime neighbour to the north²⁵.

FRANCE AND PORTUGAL

While positive signs for relations with France appeared in the early 1970s, these could not avert arising problems. France declared its support for the European Communities to extend to include "Latin" countries; President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing took part in the Coronation of Juan Carlos in 1975; and the Spanish King visited Paris in the second half of that year. However, the moment Spain took concrete steps towards EC integration, Franco-Spanish relations deteriorated, given real perceived threats to France's farmers, as well as the country's commercial interests in the Maghreb region²⁶.

French fears and demands were reflected in March 1978 European Commission documents addressing enlargement in the Mediterranean region, but offering no dates whatever for the potential admissions of Greece, Spain and Portugal. Indeed, a planned first step entailing reform to bring states closer together received a time-frame of 5-10 years. Unsurprisingly, a practical challenge involved increased performance on the part of the European Communities' budget. For its part, Spain might join the Customs Union, but that meant it reducing high customs duties on industrial goods, as well as curtailing its efforts to impose quantitative restrictions. Spain also began with its restructuring of industry, and curbing of protectionist state policy in that sphere.

The French President's June 1978 Visit to Madrid brought a new attempt to have a Franco-Spanish agreement signed. France declared that it could start talking about agriculture if Spain opened up its markets for armaments and electronics. This was beyond what the Spanish could do, given their special relationship with the United States, which also manifested in commercial relations with American corporations where advanced technologies were concerned. However, this circumstance did not impede Spain's commencement of integration negotiations in Brussels in February 1979²⁷. Yet that same year brought an escalation of tensions with France, given the latter's actual rejection of an offer regarding the aforementioned cooperation in the arms industry, which Suárez presented while on a Visit to Paris. Further unwillingness related to another issue already referred to here, i.e. cooperation in the fight against terrorism²⁸.

25 In the matter of Spanish-British relations in the period analysed in the context of Gibraltar, see also: Concepción ANGUITA OLMEDO, "La reivindicación de Gibraltar en la transición española" in Charles POWELL, Juan Carlos JIMÉNEZ REDONDO (ed.), *Del autoritarismo...*, *op. cit.*, p. 191-212.

26 For example, Moroccan exporters in relations with France were granted special trade privileges.

27 Jonathan STORY, "Redefinición de las relaciones...", *op. cit.*, p. 57-61.

28 José Mario ARMERO, *Política exterior de España...*, *op. cit.*, p. 87-88.

In the end, France agreed to the enlargement of the European Communities, but only on condition that the latter first reformed its rules in agriculture, in particular as regards fruit –and vegetable– growing and the production of wine.

In the first months of Spain's transition, circumstances for any Spanish-Portuguese rapprochement were not propitious, given events that had taken place a few months previously in Hoyo de Manzanares²⁹. Minister de Areilza came out with an initiative to overcome the climate of mistrust, and to thaw mutual relations, that at first drew no response. However, the situation began to stabilise when Spanish Ambassador Antonio Pocha returned from Lisbon. On 12 February 1976 a meeting of Foreign Ministers took place, and an agreement was reached as regards the settling of financial accounts, as well as the delimitation of the Continental Shelf, the Continental Sea and Contiguous Zone, and the use of the international part of the River Minho. However, no solutions were forthcoming in the matters of Spanish businesspeople being compensated over the nationalisation of their companies, or over the reform of the Iberian Pact³⁰.

With democratic changes, the climate of relations with Portugal improved considerably, with meetings taking place at the highest level. In November 1976, Adolfo Suárez visited Portugal, while May 1977 saw Portuguese President António Ramalho Eanes pay a Visit to Spain. The most serious then problem was the redefinition of the Iberian Pact (a Non-Aggression Treaty signed in 1942). It was decided that that document might be replaced by a Treaty on trade or cultural cooperation though –as in other matters– definite solutions were not anticipated until Spain had held its democratic elections. Thus, in the same year that the new government of Adolfo Suárez was sworn in, a Friendship and Cooperation Agreement was signed (on 22 November 1977). Along with numerous other protocols, this provided a definitive resolution of the matter of the Iberian Pact. Cooperation between the countries was now to cover matters economic (Art. IV), cultural (Art. V), scientific and technological (Art. VI), and border-related (Art. VII). For its part, military cooperation was to be limited to confidence- and security-building measures, i.e. with exchanges of personnel, joint training and exercises taking place (Art. VIII). With a view to the treaty being implemented, a Council for Spanish-Portuguese cooperation was created, with this to meet annually at Foreign Minister level, alternately in Madrid and in Lisbon (Art. IX). The Pact was signed for ten years, but was designed to be extended automatically, should neither Party give

29 In September 1975, in the town of Hoyo de Manzanares near Madrid. death sentences were passed on three FRAP members accused of murdering Policeman Lucio Rodríguez and Lieutenant in the *Guardia Civil* Antonio Pose Rodríguez.

30 José Mario ARMERO, *Política exterior de España...*, *op. cit.*, p. 36-37.

six months' notice as to its intention to withdraw from the agreement (Art. XI). With the entry into force of the agreement, the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression of 17 March 1939, together with Additional Protocols (of 29 July 1940, 20 September 1948 and 22 May 1970)³¹ went out of force.

The signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation led to a good climate for mutual visits at the levels of Heads of State, Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers. A number of problems were solved at these meetings, for example with a settling of the question of compensation for Spaniards who had suffered from Portugal's nationalisations and expropriations, as well as the 24-hour opening of border crossings and abandonment of the obligation to be in possession of a passport³².

THE HOLY SEE

Two weeks after the new Arias Navarro Government was sworn in, talks began on the normalisation of relations between Spain and The Holy See. On the Vatican side they were led by the Papal Nuncio –Vicente Enrique de Tarancón; and on the Spanish side by Minister de Areilza (though a very important role was also played by the former Spanish Ambassador to The Vatican and then Minister of Justice –Antonio Garrigues). Differences in the priorities of the two sides could be seen from the very outset. While Spain was very concerned to sign the new Concordat as soon as possible, The Vatican sought a solution to urgent problems relating to the appointment of Bishops and subsidies for the clergy. The first problem was solved by King Juan Carlos, who, in a personal letter to Pope Paul VI, opted to waive his privilege of appointing Bishops. The Church's words of approval for the democratic transition that had just begun were pronounced in November 1975, in the course of the homily delivered by Archbishop of Madrid Cardinal Vicente Enrique y Tarancón.

Areilza paid a Visit to The Vatican in April 1976. Although a working version of a Concordat had been negotiated at the end of February, The Holy See was in no great hurry to suggest any date for the signing of the treaty. Pope Paul VI convinced the Spanish Minister: "Please trust The Holy See. You will not regret it. We are on your side. We want Spain to make an orderly transition without violence..."³³. In the end, Spain had to wait until 1979 for the Concordat.

31 "Instrumento de ratificación de España del Tratado de Amistad y Cooperación entre España y Portugal, hecho en Madrid el día 22 de noviembre de 1977", *BOE*, 128/1978 de 30 de mayo de 1978.

32 On Spanish-Portuguese relations during this period, see also: Juan Carlos JIMÉNEZ REDONDO, "Las relaciones peninsulares entre el autoritarismo y la democracia: de la inercia al cambio" in Charles POWELL, Juan Carlos JIMÉNEZ REDONDO (ed.), *Del autoritarismo...*, *op. cit.*, p. 73-117.

33 Quoted from: José Mario ARMERO, *Política exterior de España...*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

As for Spain's relations with The Vatican, the main objective of the new government of Adolfo Suárez was to prepare a new legal basis for mutual relations, and to separate Church and State as far as possible. The starting point was the agreement of 28 July 1976. Negotiations at commission level with the participation of government representatives were completed at the end of 1978. As a result, four agreements signed on 3 January 1979 had the effect of replacing the Concordat of 1953.

Under the agreement on legal matters (*Acuerdo entre el Estado Español y la Santa Sede sobre asuntos jurídicos*), the Spanish state granted the Church freedom in organising its territorial structures; granted legal personality to the Spanish Episcopal Conference, orders and other religious convents and monasteries; and guaranteed immunity of places of worship, archives and other ecclesiastical documentation (Art. 1). Also, the Spanish State guaranteed rest from work every Sunday, while a catalogue of ecclesiastical holidays free from work were established as a result of negotiations (Art. 3). However, Article 6 aroused more emotions, given that the State recognised the civil effects of marriages contracted in accordance with canon law.

The starting point for the agreement concerning education and cultural affairs (*Acuerdo entre el Estado Español y la Santa Sede sobre enseñanza y asuntos culturales*) was the right of all parents to educate their children in accordance with their own religious beliefs (Art.1). In addressing the right to religious education, it was agreed that religious classes would be available at the level of colleges, primary and secondary schools. However, this subject was not to be compulsory (Art. 2). In addition, the Church obtained the right to establish Catholic schools and universities, and to set up seminaries and other institutes for ecclesiastical teaching (Art. VIII-XIII). On the other hand, the Spanish State was obliged to ensure that freedom of expression and religious freedom were not abused in the media. This was with a view to Catholics being protected against possible violations of their religious sentiments.

The *Acuerdo entre el Estado Español y la Santa Sede sobre la asistencia religiosa a las Fuerzas Armadas y el servicio militar de clérigos y religiosos* regulated the activity of the military vicariate convened for the propagation of apostolic service in the Spanish Armed Forces, as well as the obligations and functioning of religious people who are at the same time Service personnel.

The agreement on financial matters (*Acuerdo entre el Estado Español y la Santa Sede sobre asuntos económicos*) gave the Church the right to obtain from the Faithful benefits and offerings (or to organise public collections) as the basis for its maintenance. However, the State agreed to financial support for the Church: in the first stage in the form of a one-off endowment for the Bishops' Conference; and in the second - in the agreed percentage share of income-

tax revenues (Art. 2). Also there was prior agreement as regards numerous tax exemptions and tax reductions (Arts. 3-4)³⁴.

In sum, the agreements signed in 1979 can be seen as signalling a new chapter in State-Church relations. The State renounced the right to intervene in the life of the Catholic Church, while the latter lost its privileged position and instead assumed the same status as other churches and religious unions³⁵.

ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL

The first government of the Spanish transition, under Carlos Arias Navarro, aimed to implement the Madrid Agreement –as signed in November 1975 in the matter of Western Sahara, with Morocco and Mauritania. Spain’s withdrawal from the disputed territory was to take place before 26 February 1976. However, in view of the tensions between Morocco and Algeria, the authorities considered bringing the evacuation forward. The situation was so serious that Minister de Areilza decided to consult with UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. Ultimately, the United Nations decided not to send its representatives to the Referendum organised by Morocco in disagreement with democratic rules, and Spain sought –with all speed– to withdraw its troops from Western Sahara. Neither Spain nor the UN wanted to authenticate Morocco’s inclination to bring the disputed territory under its occupation.

Even with the Western Sahara issue in some way put behind it, Spain did not enjoy improved relations with Morocco. Thus, despite lofty claims from Areilza that his Visit to Morocco had achieved a “complete unblocking of mutual relations” (*desbloqueo completo de relaciones mutuas*), there proved no way of solving urgent real-world problems relating to fisheries³⁶.

Under the governments of Adolfo Suárez, relations with Arab countries were high on Spain’s foreign-policy agenda. In his speeches, Minister Oreja stressed that this group of countries was linked to Spain by many years of friendship, political and cultural cooperation, and mutual understanding³⁷. He visited Tunisia, Egypt and Syria in 1977, with these Visits having objectives both economic (to increase mutual trade and offset trade balances) and political (to have Spain’s claims to Gibraltar supported at UN fora). In May of the same

³⁴ *Conventiones inter Apostolicam Sedem et Nationem Hispanam*, on line in http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/archivio/documents/rc_seg-st_19790103_santa-sede-spagna_sp.html#SOBRE_ENSEÑANZA_Y_ASUNTOS_CULTURALES [accessed 8 April 2023].

³⁵ On Spain’s relations with the Holy See in the period analysed, see also: José Octavio RODRÍGUEZ NIETO, “Las relaciones España-Santa Sede: del tardofranquismo a la democracia” in Charles POWELL, Juan Carlos JIMÉNEZ REDONDO (ed.), *Del autoritarismo...*, *op. cit.*, p. 171-190.

³⁶ José Mario ARMERO, *Política exterior de España...*, *op. cit.*, p. 24-25.

³⁷ “Discurso de Marcelino Oreja en el foro de la Asamblea General de la ONU, 27.09.1976”, *ABC* (23 October 1976).

year, the Heir to the Throne of Saudi Arabia arrived in Spain. Following this Visit, a series of messages were published calling for Israel's withdrawal from territories occupied since 1967; and for the Palestinian nation to be granted the right to self-determination and its own homeland.

On the other hand, relations with Morocco and Algeria were not good. It was revealed that the head of the terrorist group in the Canary Islands was in Algeria. Furthermore, an inclination for independence from Spain to be sought by the Canary Islands made its appearance from the time of the decolonisation of Western Sahara onwards, given that the islanders suddenly felt very far from their homeland, and somehow left to their own devices. In relations with Morocco, the basic problem was the difficulties alluded to above, whereby Spanish fishermen could not gain access to Fishery Zones. Negotiations commenced to seek a new agreement on the issue, but these were hindered by Moroccan misgivings as to the raising at UN fora of the matter of Spain's remaining enclaves in Africa, at Ceuta and Melilla.

During the Suárez Governments' „democratic period”, the region of Africa in which Spain proved most active was The Maghreb. However, as before, the relations with the countries of that region were not good. There were fewer tensions with Mauritania, which on 13 August 1978 withdrew from Western Sahara and renounced its rights under the Madrid Treaty. Spain worst relations were those pertaining with Algeria and Morocco.

Unlike Algeria, Spain considered its role as „administering power” in Western Sahara to be over. However, it assumed that what it was departing from was international territory of indefinite status, whose fate should be decided by its people. But instead, Algeria was intent upon a Saharan republic being created. Its attitude further displeased Spain, given the granting of political asylum to members of MPAIAC (*Movimiento por la Autodeterminación e Independencia del Archipiélago Canario*), among others its leader Antonio Cubillo. Moreover, Algerian press and radio supported the idea of independence for the said archipelago –something Spain obviously considered intervention in its internal affairs, a violation of its territorial integrity, and a violation of international law. Consequently, on 21 December 1977, it recalled its Ambassador to Algeria for consultations.

After the death of Huari Bumedi in December 1978, Algerian-Spanish relations experienced a temporary improvement. So Adolfo Suárez took the opportunity of a Visit to Algeria to agree to the construction of a gas pipeline linking the two countries. For his part, Marcelino Oreja interviewed for *Le Monde* offered recognition of the *Polisario Front* as legally representative of the people of Western Sahara.

More contentious issues arose in relations with Morocco. It emerged that treaties and agreements negotiated with difficulty were not being respected –to

the extent that Spanish ships were even being detained. This could only expose the Suárez Government as weak. Moreover, Moroccan expansionism was such as to seek more than just the occupation of Western Sahara. It was also keen to occupy Spain's two enclaves in Africa: Ceuta and Melilla. One aspect operating in Morocco's favour was its apparent non-support for separatism in the Canary Islands. The problem was solved before the Organisation of African Unity whose Secretary General –the President of Gabon– made a 1977 statement to the effect that: "I do not see Africans in the Canary Islands. The Canary Islands are Spanish, European; and will remain so"³⁸.

The UCD's views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were radical. Its politicians were against any agreement. In 1978 at the UN General Assembly, Marcelino Oreja opined that peace had to be achieved on the basis of the relevant UN Resolution, with account taken of the Palestinians' right to self-determination. Spain supported the Palestinian Autonomy being granted Observer Status at the United Nations. However, it was against any Egyptian-Israeli Agreement. In its Middle East policy, it took a view different from that espoused by most Western European countries. A tangible symptom of Spanish-Palestinian friendship was the extending to the Palestine Liberation Organisation of a right to open an official headquarters in Madrid; as followed by Jasir Arafat's Visit of September 1979.

The Franco era had seen Spain fail to maintain relations with Israel, due to the State's policy towards Palestine and its traditional friendship with Arab countries. However, good relations with that group of countries had been put to the test during a period in which Spain wanted at all costs to keep its colonies in Africa (Ceuta, Melilla and Western Sahara).

Against that background, Spain's main politicians back in 1976 (including the PM and Minister of Foreign Affairs) were –as J.M. Armero³⁹ notes– privately supportive of an agreement with Israel, even as their political attitudes saw them take account of opinions from sceptics invoking arguments historical, economic (a possible oil embargo by Arab States) and diplomatic (the problem of Israel's definitive border). The Minister's remarks pushed back the moment of normalisation of Spanish-Israeli relations. Among Spain's main areas of foreign policy interest, he mentioned Europe, Latin America, the Arab world, the United States and The Vatican⁴⁰. In addition, he reproached the Israeli Government for having through the Franco years ignored the voice of many Jewish associations expressing gratitude to Spanish diplomats for their Wartime commitment to saving Jews, as well as calls for reconciliation. He

38 José Mario ARMERO, *Política exterior de España...*, *op. cit.*, p. 66-67, 127-133.

39 *Ibidem*, p. 61-63.

40 *Discurso de Marcelino Oreja en la 63 Conferencia de la Unión Interparlamentaria*, 24 September 1976

also stressed that any trend towards relations with Israel being initiated could prove unwelcome to Arab allies⁴¹. Finally, he called for Israel to recognise the Palestinian nation's right to self-determination, and for a withdrawal of troops from Occupied Territories⁴². The initiation of diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel depended on a peace agreement, i.e. on external factors not related directly to the two countries as such. A wait of two more years would prove necessary for a suitable political climate to emerge in which relations could be initiated.

THE CEECS

In the second half of 1976 it was already known that the trade relations that had managed to be nurtured with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe –along with consular relations– would soon now be complemented by political relations⁴³. It was the results of the Spanish Referendum on political reform (of 15 December 1976) that were awaited, and the positive outcome obtained was enough to convince the Government of Spain to pursue a steady regulation of its relations with the East. So it was, in 1977, that diplomatic relations commenced with Romania on 21 January; with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on 27 January; with Poland on 31 January; with the USSR, Hungary and Czechoslovakia on 9 February; and with the GDR on 4 April⁴⁴. Spain thus began with an opening-up to the East in the first half of 1977, with the only country left out of its initiation of diplomatic relations being Albania⁴⁵.

In subsequent years, personal contacts were established between the highest-level politicians in Spain and Eastern Europe. This was made possible by numerous Visits on which bilateral dialogue was engaged in. One of the reasons for such a revival on the Spanish side was a desire to garner support around the CEECs for the idea of an OSCE Review Conference being organised in Madrid in 1980. That strategy proved very effective –allowing Spain to appear in

⁴¹ *El Diario La Prensa* (24-25 November 1976).

⁴² *La Vanguardia* (28 January 1977).

⁴³ M. Oreja in one of the interviews said: "For the moment the consular and commercial relations that we maintain with them (Eastern European countries) can be considered satisfactory (...) Full political relations will be opened in due course, but for us this is an urgent necessity", *Ya* (6 August 1976).

⁴⁴ On the normalisation of Spain's relations with the GDR, see: Xavier María RAMOS DIEZ-ASTRAIN, *A través del teón de acero. Historia de las relaciones políticas entre España y la RDA (1973-1990)*, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Mº de la Presidencia, 2021. On the attitude of West Germany (the Federal Republic) towards Spain's integration with the European Communities, see: Carlos SANZ DÍAZ, "La República Federal de Alemania ante los procesos de adhesión de España y Portugal a las Comunidades Europeas (1974-1986)" in Julio PRADA RODRÍGUEZ, Emilio GRANDÍO SEOANE, José Ramón RODRÍGUEZ LAGO (ed.), *En Transición. Europa y los retos de la representatividad*, Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata, 2020, p. 83-103.

⁴⁵ José Mario ARMERO, *Política exterior de España...*, *op. cit.*, p. 57-59.

international politics as the organiser of a meeting within the framework of the only structure at the time able to bring together the states of the two different Blocs. Spain achieved both fame and prestige in this way.

Yugoslavia's Foreign Minister Milos Minić first came to Spain in December 1977. During his visit it was underlined that both states had a common viewpoint on important international problems, for example favouring an Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, ascribing to the Palestinian nation the right to self-determination, and condemning all forms of colonialism and racial discrimination in line with universal human rights. The Yugoslav Minister gave a speech on the role of non-aligned countries in international relations.

A few days later, it was the turn of Romanian Foreign Minister George Mavroscu to visit the Spanish capital. During that Visit, Minister Oreja stressed that Spain and Romania had common interests that could be developed under the OSCE framework. In May 1979, President Nicolae Ceausescu came to Madrid to mediate relations between King Juan Carlos and the Secretary General of the Spanish Communist Party, Santiago Carrillo. Then in June 1980, Minister Oreja went to Bucharest for the OSCE Review Conference.

A significant revival could also be seen in relations with the USSR. As early as on the first anniversary of the onset of diplomatic relations, Minister Oreja declared that ties with the Soviet Union were among the priorities of Spanish foreign policy⁴⁶. Equally, a turning point in relations with the entire Eastern Bloc came with the Ministerial Visit to Moscow in January 1980. Talks in that context turned their attention to the Middle East issue (both Spain and the USSR supported the Palestinian side), the OSCE process, and disarmament. An agreement on scientific and cultural cooperation was signed, even as the issue of human rights was not touched upon. The event can be treated as Spain's contribution to the policy of international *détente*.

In turn, the Visit to Spain made by Andriy Gromyko was seen to raise the new themes of the Namibian problem and the matter of Apartheid in the Republic of South Africa. In this area too, the two countries could be seen to be of one mind. Moreover, Spain demonstrated its aversion to any antagonism on the continent, and the USSR declared that it would not use nuclear weapons against any country that renounced the manufacture, stockpiling and purchase of this type of armament.

It was at the end of February 1978 that Minister Oreja visited Poland. At the planning stage of that trip, it was made clear that he was again seeking to convince somebody –this time the Polish authorities– to swing behind Madrid's bid to host the OSCE Review Conference. However, by the time he actually visited Poland, the success of that bid was already a known quantity.

⁴⁶ *Izvestia* (8 February 1978).

In talks, the Spanish Minister expressed his willingness to participate actively in the policy of international *détente*, and in bridge-building between the Blocs in accordance with UN and OSCE regulations.

The return Visit of Polish Foreign Minister Emil Wojtaszek took place on 14 November 1979. The Spanish authorities took that opportunity to thank the Pole for his support in organising the OSCE Summit in the Spanish capital, and for his cooperative stance *vis-à-vis* the Belgrade Review Meeting. Interestingly, Minister Oreja also offered a polite assurance that, if the Spanish proposal were to not gain approval for some reason, his government would support Warsaw's bid.

Spain also developed friendly relations with Czechoslovakia. The March 1979 Visit of Minister Bohuslav Chřoupek to Madrid bore witness to the signature of agreements on cultural and transport-related cooperation. The two sides also expressed their support for the idea of reductions in arms, and sizes of armed forces, in Europe⁴⁷.

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

It was in November 1976 that Oreja announced the normalisation of relations with Mexico⁴⁸. However, on 17 March 1977, the latter's relations with the Spanish Republic were cancelled; and on 28 March Diplomatic Notes were exchanged between Minister Oreja and his Mexican counterpart Santiago Roel. This was the moment at which diplomatic relations officially commenced. From that time on, Mexico became one of the key trading partners in Latin America, with Spain for its part offering Mexico a link into Europe⁴⁹.

In April 1977, President Suárez visited Mexico, where he outlined a new vision for Ibero-American policy based on the three pillars of a common past and cultural heritage; the tendency for Ibero-American, European and Arab interests to move in the direction of harmonisation; and support for integration on the American continent. The aim was for any cooperation to be based around such values as credibility, continuity, non-discrimination, community and indivisibility (understanding cooperation in all fields).

Spain's democratisation had a very positive influence on relations with Latin American countries. The process increased interest in the region on the part of the Government, society and the press. A tangible manifestation of this was the founding of the Ibero-American Centre for Cooperation, becoming the Institute for Ibero-American Cooperation in 1979.

⁴⁷ José Mario ARMERO, *Política exterior de España...*, *op. cit.*, p. 109-113.

⁴⁸ *Pueblo* (23 November 1976).

⁴⁹ *35 años de relaciones México-España*, on line in <http://www.casamerica.es/politica/35-anos-de-relaciones-diplomaticas-mexico-espana> [accessed 15 April 2023].

Relations bilaterally were also reassessed, with human-rights issues dominating in the contacts made with Argentina, Chile and certain other states. Economic, cultural and political cooperation developed with the members of the Andean Community, Mexico, Panama and the Dominican Republic. Spanish-Cuban relations also entered a new phase. However, relations with one country in the region –Guatemala– were not so good. Indeed, following an incident in which Spanish Embassy employees were actually killed, diplomatic ties were severed altogether. Where multilateral fora were concerned, Spain gained admittance to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), as well as Observer status *vis-à-vis* the Andean Community⁵⁰. “The transition was also an asset of the new foreign policy of democratic Spain. Spanish diplomacy mobilised its resources, including the nascent Spanish Cooperation, to help other Latin American nations under authoritarian governments or burdened by bloody civil and military conflicts, so that they would follow a path similar to the successful path taken by Spanish society towards democracy and its principles, values and institutions”⁵¹.

“COLLECTIVE” INTERNATIONALISATION⁵²

NATO

Today, Spain is fully recognized in the international arena because it has clearly defined foundations and main directions of its external activities. A few decades ago it was not so obvious... Spain’s membership in NATO is an undoubted success story, although this does not mean that it was an easy path⁵³.

The early years of Spain’s transition saw the political scene divided on the question of eventual NATO membership. Some felt that the alliance with the United States by itself offered sufficient possibilities for participation in the Western security system; while others felt that was not enough. In any case, it was known that any potential integration with the Alliance would only happen

50 José Mario ARMERO, *Política exterior de España ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 42-43, 60-61, 120-127.

51 Carlos SANZ DÍAZ, “Transiciones de ida y vuelta. Democracia, memoria histórica y aprendizajes entre España y América Latina” in Carlos SANZ DÍAZ (ed.), *Transiciones democráticas y memoria histórica: aprendizajes de ida y vuelta entre América Latina y España*, Madrid: Fundación Carolina, 2023, p. 16.

52 This subchapter was developed on the basis of previous research (see: Małgorzata MIZERSKA-WROTKOWSKA, „Impact of Spain’s democratisation on its multilateral relations”, *Reality of Politics. Estimates - Comments – Forecast*, 8 (2017), p. 51-55) taking into account the latest literature on the subject.

53 Michele TESTONI, Alberto BUENO, “40 años de la pertenencia de España a la OTAN: desafíos pasados y futuros de una relación procelosa”, *Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional*, 8 (1/2022), p. 1-15.

after the country had democratised in full⁵⁴. Therefore, notwithstanding the support extended to Spanish integration plans by the USA (as in the statement by H. Kissinger dated December 12, 1975), a then request for accession to the Alliance was straightforwardly rejected⁵⁵.

In the "pre-democratic" period of the Suárez Governments, the Spanish authorities lacked a clear position on eventual NATO membership. On the one hand, Minister Oreja had become clear about the fact that the agreement with the US was indeed bilateral in nature, and thus failed to offer guarantees regarding defence for allies⁵⁶. On the other hand, that same Minister felt Spain's real security needs were being met, even as Spain itself was contributing significantly to the security guarantee for the continent as a whole⁵⁷. This encouraged a belief in the Minister that the Alliance might make the first overtures. And such a step was indeed taken as early as in December 1976, at the Annual Meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Its Declaration appreciated the ongoing efforts within the transition of Spain, even as it was made clear that membership of NATO for Spain was conditional upon its achieving full democratisation⁵⁸. At the same time, speeches favourable to Spain were made by such politicians as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns⁵⁹. Minister Oreja remained unconvinced, however; taking the view that this was an issue of such importance nationally that all the "pros" and "cons" needed to be analysed precisely⁶⁰. This reservation meant that it was for another Minister in another Government to submit Spain's application for NATO membership.

The pursuit of foreign policy under Spain's UCD governments was hampered by the need for compromises within the ruling party to be sought. The country's activity abroad became a source of discord between Spain's major political parties. Such differences of opinion were on show during the parliamentary debates on NATO taking place in March and April 1978. And the PSOE and PCE simply declared their opposition to Spain's membership of the organisation.

⁵⁴ The curious thing is that Portugal was able to become a member of the Alliance in 1949 despite the fact that it was ruled in an authoritarian manner by Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. It was possible thanks to Portugal's friendly neutrality towards the Allied countries during World War II (although there were also certain friendly gestures towards the Reich: sale of mineral raw materials, announcement of national mourning after Hitler's death).

⁵⁵ José Mario ARMERO, *Política exterior de España...*, *op. cit.*, p. 37-38.

⁵⁶ *Ya* (6 August 1976).

⁵⁷ *Cambio 16* (16 August 1976).

⁵⁸ *ABC* (19 November 1976).

⁵⁹ *ABC* (11 December 1976).

⁶⁰ *ABC* (19 March 1977).

A key participant in the NATO debate was obviously Minister Oreja himself. For him, positive aspects relating to Spain's potential membership were the fact of participation in an important international structure, the access granted to political and strategic information, and the possibilities offered for the armed forces to be modernised. On the minus side, disadvantages of such a manoeuvre were seen to include the taking-on of new obligations to come to the defence of an ally under military attack, the presence of a foreign army on Spanish territory, and the sacrifices required by any pursuit of principles of solidarity as regards allies. This all left the Minister opining that such a decision on which the country's security depended should enjoy the support of a majority of all Spain's citizens –and what was more, a support founded in both in-depth analysis and knowledge⁶¹. A similar opinion came to be held by Prime Minister Suarez: NATO - yes, but under conditions that took into account Spain's specificity and security requirements; and only with the support of a parliamentary majority⁶².

In practice that meant a postponement of NATO membership, and its being made conditional upon a positive outcome in the debate nationally. None of that prevented a commencement of negotiations on the conditions that would underpin accession to the military-cooperation organisation. Equally, these were hardly favoured by such events as the November 1978 coup attempt⁶³, or the activity of the terrorist organisation ETA –issues which both raised the doubts of certain NATO members as to the credibility of Spain as a potential ally.

September 1981 was a crucial date, given the expiry of the Spanish-American military-cooperation agreement. That meant a certain pressure, as authorities in the USA saw any negotiations on a new agreement as running in parallel with those on Spain's possible accession to NATO. Added to that was the way in which Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo was now seeking a true hastening of the conclusion of talks, given a fear of PSOE coming to power, with all its fierce opposition to NATO accession⁶⁴. Instruments thus gained signature

61 *Diario de Sesiones del Senado*, 9/1978, p. 460-461.

62 *Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados*, 3/1979, p. 43.

63 As part of Operation Galaxy, conspirators from the *Guardia Civil*, Police and Army (Antonio Tejero and Ricardo Saenz de Ynestrillas, among others) planned in November 1978 to occupy Moncloa Palace, arrest members of the government of President Adolfo Suárez and force the King to convene a government of national salvation. Thanks to a denunciation of people initiated in the plot, the *coup d'état* was foiled. Tejero was imprisoned for only seven months. On 23 February 1981 he tried again unsuccessfully to seize power via representatives of the Army and *Guardia Civil* when he entered the Congress of Deputies in front of an armed detachment during the swearing-in ceremony of Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo as President of the Government (Prime Minister).

64 On the change in PSOE's approach to NATO, see: Juan ANDRADE, "Del socialismo autogestionario a la OTAN: notas sobre el cambio ideológico en el PSOE durante la Transición a la democracia", *Historia Actual Online*, 14 (2007), p. 97-106.

on 10 December 1981, and were deposited at Washington on 30 May 1982. A new PSOE government was indeed in place, and it made NATO membership dependent on a positive Referendum result. Paradoxically, Prime Minister Felipe González went against his own previously-expressed views, deciding that he would seek to convince Spaniards to remain in NATO. He argued that accession to the Alliance had not caused Spain to lose political autonomy, while an ongoing presence within its structures would allow for active and effective participation within the European Communities. In the event, the Referendum was won (albeit with just 52.6% coming out in favour), and the Spanish government came to an agreement with NATO as regards new rules for Alliance membership⁶⁵.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

All of this time, great progress was being made by Spain when it came to its road to Council of Europe membership. For Minister Oreja, this was just as important as membership of the European Communities. To address the efforts, on 22 September 1976, the CoE adopted a Resolution⁶⁶ that praised Spain for beginning its process of democratisation and for its application of amnesty for political prisoners; while also calling for total freedom of speech, and independence in the media. In response, Minister Oreja took the opportunity provided by his speech to the UN General Assembly dated 27 September 1976 to declare the Spanish authorities' respect for human rights –a tangible proof of which was the signing the following day of the International Covenant on Human Rights. These UN-related actions led the Council of Europe to the January 1977 issuance of a declaration that voiced approval for democratic change ongoing in Spain.

The Spanish Government was concerned to achieve Spain's admission to the Council of Europe with all speed. However, it was only after democratic elections that became a real prospect. In July 1977, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council adopted a Resolution that congratulated the Spanish nation on its political maturity as regards free elections to Parliament. At the same time, it invited a delegation of Spanish parliamentarians to participate as Observers at a Plenary Session planned for October⁶⁷. The crowning moment of the admission process came just one month later –on 24 November 1977⁶⁸–

65 More on the subject: Małgorzata MIZERSKA-WROTKOWSKA, *Polityka zagraniczna Hiszpanii...*, *op. cit.*, p. 235, 238-241.

66 *Resolution 640 (1976), Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe.*

67 "Una representación de las Cortes Españolas, invitada a participar en los trabajos del Consejo de Europa", *ABC* (08 July 1977).

68 For comparison, Portugal was approved by the Council of Europe on 22.09.1976. More on the subject: José Mario ARMERO, *Política exterior de España...*, *op. cit.*, p. 89-92.

when Spain became the twentieth Full Member of the Council of Europe. A new democratic Constitution had not yet been proclaimed at that point, but Prime Minister Suarez, the Presidents of Congress and Senate (Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Antonio Fontan) and Opposition leaders (Felipe González and Santiago Carrillo) all promised that they would proclaim such a Constitution, and that it would conform to the principles of the CoE's 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.

The curious thing is that the commitment of Spanish politicians to their country's admission to the Council of Europe did gain quite tangible appreciation. In the years 1981-83 it was José María de Areilza who served as President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, while –immediately thereafter– it was Marcelino Oreja who took the post of Secretary General of the organisation in the 1984-9 term⁶⁹.

CONCLUSIONS

To put it briefly, Spain's democratisation can be seen as a necessary condition for its internationalisation both "individually" (in relations with individual countries) and "collectively" (at the forum offered by international structures). The process was necessary for Spain to regain full rights in the international arena. In the previous period (under Francisco Franco), Spain was not and could not be a member of any international body at which decisions important from the point of view of security and international cooperation were taken. Friendly arrangements were in essence limited to the agreement with the United States. But, thanks to efficient diplomacy in the late 1970s and 1980s, all barriers were gradually overcome. Spain proved able to acquire an extensive network of bilateral relations, and membership of numerous international organisations. The culmination of this process was its accession to organisations later developing into the European Union. As Josep Borrell Fontelles says in the Prologue to a very interesting book: "Accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986 served to consolidate de-

69 Francesc GRANELL, "España y las Organizaciones Internacionales: in José María Beneyto, Juan Carlos Pereira (ed.), *Política exterior española: un balance de futuro*, vol. 2, Madrid: Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos de la Universidad San Pablo-CEU, 2011, p. 1063; see also: Carlos LÓPEZ, "La adhesión de España Al Consejo de Europa" on line in https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/la_adhesion_de_espana_al_consejo_de_europa-es-008b2e64-c1cd-41f1-89ae-173532464c04.html [accessed 08 February 2024].

Recently, an interesting article was published on the basis of Catalan separatism in the context of the legislation of the Council of Europe. The author argues that "there is no place for the radical democratic principle in Council of Europe law". This organization protects and promotes democracy "in which the rule of law, human rights and democracy are inseparable principles forming a single whole" (Helena TORROJA, "The Council of Europe and the Catalan Secessionist Process: The Authoritarian Drift of the Radical Democratic Principle", *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*, 16 (1/2024), p. 89-128).

mocracy in Spain"⁷⁰. It was thus in 1986 that there began a period decisive in the consolidation of Spanish democracy and its projection to the rest of the world⁷¹.

Where more-detailed aspects are concerned:

1) The most important achievements in Spain's relations with the United States include the signing in January 1976 (and ratification on 18 September 1976) of a new cooperation pact in treaty form requiring ratification by the US Senate. This agreement meant the strengthening of Spain's institutional ties with NATO, and of Spanish-American cooperation in the arms industry.

2) A major breakthrough in Spanish-British relations came with the signing of the Lisbon Declaration on Gibraltar dated 10 April 1980. The two governments expressed a willingness to settle their dispute in accordance with existing UN rules, a willingness to begin negotiations, and a willingness to re-establish communications. Although the Lisbon Declaration was a long time coming, it did represent a giant step towards the normalisation of Spain's relations with the UK.

3) The problems in Spain's relations with France were mainly due to the latter's concerns about the economic consequences of Spain's possible accession to the European Communities. In the end, France agreed to the enlargement of the European Communities if on the condition that reforms of EU laws relating to agricultural policy were carried out beforehand. Relations with Spain's western neighbour, Portugal, also improved during the transition period. In November 1977, a Friendship and Cooperation Agreement was signed which, alongside a number of Protocols, achieved definitive settlement as regards the Iberian Pact signed in 1939. The signing of the new treaty took place amidst a good climate of reciprocal Visits at the highest political level.

4) There was also a breakthrough in Spain's relations with The Holy See. On 3 January 1979, four agreements on various aspects of Church life were

70 Josep BORRELL FONTELLES, "Prólogo" in Antonio MORENO JUSTE, Carlos SANZ DÍAZ, Ricardo MARTÍN DE LA GUARDIA (coord.), *Memoria de Europa: La adhesión de España a las Comunidades Europeas*, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, M^o de la Presidencia, 2023; see also: Małgorzata MIZERSKA-WROTKOWSKA, "Génesis del ingreso de Polonia y de España en la Unión Europea", *Aportes. Revista de Historia Contemporánea*, 84 (1/2014), p. 193-225; Delia CONTRERAS GARCÍA, "Las relaciones de España y la CEE (1962-1979)" in Charles POWELL, Juan Carlos JIMÉNEZ REDONDO (ed.), *Del autoritarismo...*, *op. cit.*, p. 119-142. On the beginnings of Spain's European integration in the context of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, see: Antonio MORENO JUSTE, Carlos SANZ DÍAZ, Emanuele TREGLIA, "España y la nueva Europa. Treinta años del Tratado de Maastricht", *Revista de Estudios Europeos*, 82 (2023), p. 69-79.

71 On Spanish foreign policy during this period, see: Juan Carlos PEREIRA CASTAÑARES, Adela María ALIJA GARABITO, Misael Arturo LÓPEZ ZAPICO (ed.), *La política exterior de España. De la Transición a la consolidación democrática (1986-2001)*, Madrid: Catarata, 2018.

signed, replacing the 1953 Concordat. These agreements marked a new chapter in State-Church relations. The State renounced the right to intervene in the life of the Catholic Church, while the Church lost its privileged position.

5) Relations with Arab states constituted an important point among Spain's foreign policy priorities in the period under review. The key development in relations with Morocco and Mauritania was the implementation of the 1975 Madrid Agreement; and the withdrawal of Spain and Mauritania from Western Sahara. However, relations with Morocco remained tense due to the unresolved issue of access to Fishing Zones for Spanish fishermen. A point of contention in relations with Algeria was the granting of political asylum to the leader of the Canary Islands separatist group. Over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Spain adopted a decidedly pro-Palestinian position. It was against the Egyptian-Israeli agreement. Close cooperation with Arab countries prevented Spain from establishing diplomatic relations with Israel (which only in fact happened in 1986).

6) Spain's democratisation had a very positive influence on relations with Latin American countries. The tangible manifestation of this interest was the creation of the Ibero-American Centre for Cooperation (becoming the Institute for Ibero-American Cooperation in 1979). Bilateral relations were re-evaluated, as when diplomatic relations were established between Spain and Mexico in 1977. Spanish-Cuban relations also entered a new phase. The only country with which relations were less good was Guatemala.

7) In the early months of 1977, Spain opened up to the East, given the establishment of diplomatic relations with eight CEECs (other than Albania) in the January-April period. One of the reasons for such a revival on Spain's part was its desire to win support among Eastern European countries for the idea of the 1980 OSCE Review Conference being organised in Madrid. That strategy proved very effective as Spain in an international politics context managed to appear as the organiser of a meeting within the framework of the only then structure ringing together states of the two different Blocs. A significant revival could also be seen in relations with the USSR –viewed as a priority matter for Spanish foreign policy.

8) In the early years of Spain's transition, the political scene was divided over the question of eventual NATO membership. However, it was known that potential integration with the Alliance could only take place following the country's full democratisation. Negotiations were accelerated by the September 1981 expiry of the Spain-US cooperation agreement, and the then government's concerns that the PSOE (a party opposed to joining the Alliance) would come to power at the next elections, which it indeed

did. Yet Spain became a member of NATO on 30 May 1982; the new government made a U-turn, and (just) succeeded in convincing Spaniards to remain in NATO, in the context of the Referendum it organised. Membership was then an important bargaining chip in negotiations with the European Communities.

9) The condition for Spain's admission to the Council of Europe was commencement of a process of democratisation in the country (*inter alia* with amnesty for political prisoners, total freedom of speech, and independence of the media). It was also of course necessary for free parliamentary elections to be held. Having fulfilled that condition, Spain was admitted to the Council of Europe on 24 November 1977, promising to adopt a new Constitution in accordance with the principles of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Juan ANDRADE, "Del socialismo autogestionario a la OTAN: notas sobre el cambio ideológico en el PSOE durante la Transición a la democracia", *Historia Actual Online*, 14 (2007), p. 97-106.
- Concepción ANGUITA OLMEDO, "La reivindicación de Gibraltar en la transición española" in Charles POWELL, Juan Carlos JIMÉNEZ REDONDO (ed.), *Del autoritarismo a la democracia. Estudios de política exterior*, Madrid: Silex, 2007, p. 191-212.
- José Mario ARMERO, *Política exterior de España en democracia*, Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1989.
- Krystian BARŁOŻEWSKI, *Wpływ ekspansji zagranicznej na efektywność przedsiębiorstw*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck, 2017.
- José M^a BENEYTO PÉREZ, *Política exterior española*, Madrid: Tecnos, 2023.
- Josep BORRELL FONTELLES, "Prólogo" in Antonio MORENO JUSTE, Carlos SANZ DÍAZ, Ricardo MARTÍN DE LA GUARDIA (coord.), *Memoria de Europa: La adhesión de España a las Comunidades Europeas*, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, M^o de la Presidencia, 2023.
- Virgilio Fransico CANDELA SEVILA, "Cuarenta años de democracia en España: análisis de las interpretaciones histórico políticas del proceso de transición (1977-2017)", *En Contexto. Revista de Investigación en Investigación en Administración, Contabilidad, Economía y Sociedad*, 6 (8/2018), p. 49-61.
- Delia CONTRERAS GARCÍA, "Las relaciones de España y la CEE (1962-1979)" in Charles POWELL, Juan Carlos JIMÉNEZ REDONDO (ed.), *Del autoritarismo a la democracia. Estudios de política exterior*, Madrid: Silex, 2007, p. 119-142.

- Conventiones inter Apostolicam Sedem et Nationem Hispanam*, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/archivio/documents/rc_seg-st_19790103_santa-sede-spagna_sp.html#SOBRE_ENSEÑANZA_Y_ASUNTOS_CULTURALES [accessed 8 April 2023].
- Marie-Claude CHAPUT, Julio PÉREZ-SERRANO (ed.), *La transición española. Nuevos enfoques para un viejo debate*, Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2015.
- Gloria GARCÍA GONZÁLEZ, Manuel REDERO SAN ROMÁN, “Prensa y opinión pública en la transición política española”, *Anales de la Universidad de Alicante: Historia contemporánea*, 8-9 (1991-1992), p. 85-120.
- Yurena GONZÁLEZ AYUSO, *Pasado y presente de la transición. Un estado de la cuestión pertinente*, Instituto de Estudios Latinoamericanos - Universidad de Alcalá, Documentos de trabajo IELAT, 80 (noviembre 2015).
- Mirosław JAROSIŃSKI, *Procesy i modele internacjonalizacji polskich przedsiębiorstw*, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, 2013.
- Juan Carlos JIMÉNEZ REDONDO, “Las relaciones peninsulares entre el autoritarismo y la democracia: de la inercia al cambio” in Charles POWELL, Juan Carlos JIMÉNEZ REDONDO (ed.), *Del autoritarismo a la democracia. Estudios de política exterior*, Madrid: Silex, 2007, p. 73-117.
- Ángel LINARES, “La adhesión de España a la OTAN: notas para una revisión crítica”, *Historia Actual Online*, 32 (2013), p. 23-30.
- Carlos LÓPEZ, “La adhesión de España Al Consejo de Europa” on line in https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/la_adhesion_de_espana_al_consejo_de_europa-es-008b2e64-c1cd-41f1-89ae-173532464c04.html [accessed 08 February 2024].
- Roberto MESA, “La normalización exterior de España” in Ramón COTALERO (ed.), *Transición política y consolidación democrática. España, 1975-1986*, Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1992.
- Małgorzata MIZERSKA-WROTKOWSKA, *Polityka zagraniczna Hiszpanii w latach 1788-1986. Od marginalizacji do integracji*, Warszawa: Uniwersytet Warszawski, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, 2019.
- Małgorzata MIZERSKA-WROTKOWSKA, “Impact of Spain’s democratisation on its multilateral relations”, *Reality of Politics. Estimates - Comments – Forecast*, 8 (2017), p. 45-60.
- Małgorzata MIZERSKA-WROTKOWSKA, “Génesis del ingreso de Polonia y de España en la Unión Europea”, *Aportes. Revista de Historia Contemporánea*, 84 (1/2014), p. 193-225.
- Antonio MORENO JUSTE, Carlos SANZ DÍAZ, Emanuele TREGLIA, “España y la nueva Europa. Treinta años del Tratado de Maastricht”, *Revista de Estudios Europeos*, 82 (2023), p. 69-79.
- Juan Carlos PEREIRA CASTAÑARES, Adela María ALIJA GARABITO, Misael Arturo LÓPEZ ZAPICO (ed.), *La política exterior de España. De la Transición a la consolidación democrática (1986-2001)*, Madrid: Catarata, 2018.

- Pablo PÉREZ LÓPEZ (dir.), *La transición española: una perspectiva internacional*, Cizur Menor: Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, 2020.
- Charles T. POWELL, "La dimensión exterior de la transición política española", *Revista del Centro de Estudios Constitucionales*, 18 (1994), p. 79-116.
- Charles POWELL, "Estados Unidos y España, de la dictadura a la democracia: el papel de Henry A. Kissinger (1969-1977)" in Charles POWELL, Juan Carlos JIMÉNEZ REDONDO (ed.), *Del autoritarismo a la democracia. Estudios de política exterior*, Madrid: Silex, 2007, p. 19-71.
- Charles POWELL, "Henry Kissinger y España, de la dictadura a la democracia", *Historia y Política*, 17 (2007), p. 223-251.
- Charles POWELL, *El amigo americano. España y Estados Unidos: de la dictadura a la democracia*, Madrid: Círculo de Lectores, 2011.
- Xavier María RAMOS DIEZ-ASTRAIN, *A través del teón de acero. Historia de las relaciones políticas entre España y la RDA (1973-1990)*, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, Mº de la Presidencia, 2021.
- José Octavio RODRÍGUEZ NIETO, "Las relaciones España-Santa Sede: del tardofranquismo a la democracia" in Charles POWELL, Juan Carlos JIMÉNEZ REDONDO (ed.), *Del autoritarismo a la democracia. Estudios de política exterior*, Madrid: Silex, 2007, p. 171-190.
- Carlos SANZ DÍAZ, "La República Federal de Alemania ante los procesos de adhesión de España y Portugal a las Comunidades Europeas (1974-1986)" in Julio PRADA RODRÍGUEZ, Emilio GRANDÍO SEOANE, José Ramón RODRÍGUEZ LAGO (ed.), *En Transición. Europa y los retos de la representatividad*, Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata, 2020, p. 83-103.
- Carlos SANZ DÍAZ, "Transiciones de ida y vuelta. Democracia, memoria histórica y aprendizajes entre España y América Latina" in Carlos SANZ DÍAZ (ed.), *Transiciones democráticas y memoria histórica: aprendizajes de ida y vuelta entre América Latina y España*, Madrid: Fundación Carolina, 2023, p. 15-63.
- Jonathan STORY, Benny POLLACK, "Spain's transition: external and domestic linkages" in Geoffrey PRIDHAM (ed.), *Encouraging democracy*, London: Leicester University Press 1991.
- Jonathan STORY, "Redefinición de las relaciones exteriores de España: 1975-1989" in Richard GILLESPIE, Fernando RODRIGO, Jonathan STORY (coord.), *Las relaciones exteriores de la España democrática*, Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1995.
- Michele TESTONI, Alberto BUENO, "40 años de la pertenencia de España a la OTAN: desafíos pasados y futuros de una relación procelosa", *Revista de Estudios en Seguridad Internacional*, 8 (1/2022), p. 1-15.
- Helena TORROJA, "The Council of Europe and the Catalan Secessionist Process: The Authoritarian Drift of the Radical Democratic Principle", *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*, 16 (1/2024), p. 89-128.

Lawrence WHITEHEAD, “Democracy by Convergence and Southern Europe: A Comparative Perspective” in Geoffrey PRIDHAM (ed.), *Encouraging Democracy: The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe*, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991.

Marzanna WITEK-HAJDUK, *Strategie internacjonalizacji polskich przedsiębiorstw w warunkach akcesji Polski do Unii Europejskiej*, Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, 2010.

ARTÍCULO RECIBIDO: 12-01-2024, ACEPTADO: 21-06-2024